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Foreword 
 
My Major Research Paper (MRP) has fulfilled the requirements of my Master of Environmental 
Studies degree addressing the various aspects of my Plan of Study by bringing together the ideas 
and perplexities that I encountered in my program. While my MRP omitted much that was 
contained in my Plan, it also included, reformulated, expanded and critically wove together a 
great proportion of it. 
 
I knew I wanted to: 
 
a) grasp the theoretical shift that had taken place in academia since I completed my 
undergraduate degree; 
 
a) explore various narratives regarding nature and our relationship to it; 
 
b) include the work of the Institute for Social Research (the Frankfurt School); 
 
c) engage the work of Emmanuel Levinas with respect to environmentalism; 
 
e) link theory and practice by including a planning perspective; 
 
f) take theory to practicality with respect to renewable energy by working with the Toronto 
Renewable Energy Co-operative and its offshoot Windshare. 
 
My MRP managed to formulate a blend of these parts of my Plan, incorporating both my Area of 
Concentration and my components in a rather different way than I had anticipated. With 
continued research, writing and consultation came the realization that the structure and premises 
of the enterprise as originally conceived lacked a thematic conceptualization, and therefore a 
reformulation was required. Overall I think my MRP has both stayed true to my initial intentions 
while at the same time surpassed them. 
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Abstract 
 
This paper addressed my desire to respond to the devastation of nature through the post-
phenomenological thought of Emmanuel Levinas. Its intent was to describe Levinas’s event of 
the pre-cognitive face-to-face encounter with the radical alterity of the Other as ethical, an appeal 
that commands a responsible response to the otherness of the Other. The paper presents 
discourses that address the conceptual roots of our environmental destruction. The first discourse 
is a critique of the Scientific Revolution of the Enlightenment that sees the shift from a medieval 
world-view to one structured along scientific-rational terms as the problematic. The second looks 
at our relationship to nature through the work of the Institute for Social Research (the first wave 
of the Frankfurt School) who saw the objectifying universal character of reason itself via the 
concept as having led to our domination of both outer and inner nature (ourselves). The paper 
brings Levinas’s development of singular infinite ethical responsibility into view providing a 
way to move beyond the impasses of the prior discourses as well as the perceived absence of 
ethics in poststructuralism/postmodernism theories. Levinas’s thought offers us an insight into 
the realm of the environmental movement as a political and institutional response to the cry of 
nature as a face-to-face event. The paper has implications for planning as well as policy 
directions. It does so by focussing on the establishment of the first wind turbine in an urban 
setting on Toronto’s lakeshore by the Toronto Renewable Energy Co-operative (TREC) as a 
model for the production/ownership/management of power in Ontario. 
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Section I 
1.0 Introduction 
 It is with some distance of time and place that I approach this last productive effort 
required of me by the faculty. While the academic milieu is no longer as prominent a feature of 
my everyday life, the discussions entered into in this paper, by virtue of their philosophical 
nature, grapple with questions that have been and will continue to be posed as part of the 
ongoing conversations in which we are engaged. At the same time, the heightened visibility and 
topicality of “the environment” and the greater sense of urgency with respect to its deterioration 
has meant the retention of the timeliness of this paper. With nothing less than the Earth itself at 
stake, increased relevance can however, paradoxically betray the need to move beyond what 
appears to be the ever-increasing expansion in greenwashing strategies and techniques, making it 
that much more important for us to come to terms with the damage we continue to inflict on a 
planet increasingly incapable of self-repair.  
This paper is also in many ways connected to some of the perplexities I encountered in 
my postgraduate program. I had completed the majority of my undergraduate work at a time 
when the dominant discourse in the university was that of structural Marxism as a critical 
understanding of the world. When I returned to York, the conversation had changed, and with 
my reading of Foucault and others, I began to grapple with making sense of what had taken place 
to bring about this epistemological turn. My participation in the Faculty of Environmental 
Studies also made it important for me to contextualize the environmental movement and 
concerns generated in this area of study into my own understanding, as well as into the 
considerations of my paper. Consequently, this paper is in part an attempt to come to terms with 
transformations, both in the ideas, the conversations and the specific area of study, as a blending 
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process of these factors. For me, the tenor and the linguistic turn in the conversations that greeted 
my return to York can best be described as a change in the way in which subjectivity is 
conferred: from an Althusserian “hail” delivered by the social structure, to a Levinasian 
subjectivity as a responsible response to the call of the Other’s alterity. 
Yet, at its heart, this paper is concerned with delineating what does not lend itself to 
thematization, yet must inevitably be put into words. Its intent is to describe the event of the 
encounter with the radical alterity of the non-human Other, an Other that lies beyond the ego and 
its assimilations, interrupting us in our Being with an anterior language, an appeal and command 
that escapes the grasp of identity. It is in the call for a responsible response to the otherness of 
the other that we will glimpse an unrepresentable anarchic beginning, showing itself only after 
the event, responding to a call that precedes itself. While it can be said that non-human nature is 
far removed from the ideas of the post-phenomenological philosopher, Talmudic commentator 
and thinker Emmanuel Levinas (1906-1995), it is in the pursuit of his idea of the singularity of 
infinite ethical responsibility for the Other that we will hope to locate this moment, as a point 
from which the non-human Other may not be lost. 
 This paper began with a desire to respond to the crisis afflicting the environment as a 
motivation that would exceed an academic exercise. The development by TREC (Toronto 
Renewable Energy Co-operative), and its offshoot Windshare of a wind turbine on Lake Ontario 
elicited my excitement as it represented the possibility of writing about the actualization of the 
turbine, an opportunity to be constructive, to do more than theorize. Yet when the writing began, 
the wind turbine seemed to require a theoretical discussion and context from which to advocate 
on its behalf. The theoretical possibilities of the writings of Emmanuel Levinas presented such 
an opportunity, and rather than receding, the wind turbine’s move to the Addendum allowed for 
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a space to develop so that its presentation could emerge out of an environmental movement that 
was, in a post-Levinasian fashion, responding to the call of a devastated nature. Post-Levinasian 
environmentalism would not advocate for mutual reciprocity, compassion, respect, participating 
consciousness, depth over shallowness, or interconnectedness with nature; it would not point to 
the ways in which we are a part of a holistic natural world, identifying with nature through a 
wider sense of self, nor would it turn to ecocentrism as the reversal of anthropocentrism. What it 
would do, out of nothing but the sheer otherness of the other, is see the possibility of 
encountering the non-human other non-violently and responsibly.     
The present work is divided into six sections. The second of these, entitled, Discourses 
Regarding the Conceptual Roots of our Environmental Devastation, begins by portraying two 
academic discourses that represent significant positions in the ongoing historical conversation 
concerning what we have come to define as nature. Their presentation lays out what each 
perceives as having defined our current relationship to nature, and in so doing, the question of 
ethics is raised. The inclusion of these discourses anticipates the Levinasian proposal that 
provides a way of moving beyond their impasses as they have forgotten Levinas’s pre-cognitive 
ethical moment of exteriority, an event that occurs before all else, as once cognition takes place 
the ethical moment has passed.  
 The first chapter in this section presents the view that it is the Enlightenment, with the 
advent of the Scientific Revolution, that is responsible for the “disenchantment of the world” and 
hence the transformation in the West from a traditional medieval/religious system of 
representation to one where that relationship is structured through scientific-rational terms. This 
discourse proceeds by presenting our relationship to the medieval world and non-human nature 
as one dominated by “meaningfulness,” indicative of a relationship that is more metaphysically 
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empathetic, a symbolically oriented outlook. This discourse points to the advent of the Scientific 
Revolution and the modern period as the conceptual problematic, responsible for the 
transformation of our relationship with nature into one that is instrumentally rational. The 
conclusion of this theory is that the shift to scientific rationalism and literal interpretation has led 
to our complete control and domination of nature (relegated to a meaningless objective realm) in 
the search for the practical uses for the things of nature.  
The second chapter in this section conveys selections from the neo-Marxist theories of 
the Frankfurt School for Social Research through the works of two of its principle members, 
Theodore Adorno and Max Horkheimer. Though this discourse shares some understandings with 
the previous one, unlike the contention that views the shift to the scientific-rational mode of 
apprehending reality in the modern world as responsible for our current relationship with nature, 
it is the argument of Critical Theory that it is the universal characteristic of objectifying reason 
itself, via the concept, that leads to the domination of outer nature and hence, the link to the 
domination of the self (inner nature) and others. Rather than having arisen at some historical 
period, as a distinctive mark of the demythologization of nature, “the disease of reason is that 
reason was born from man’s urge to dominate nature” (Horkheimer 1974, 176). This discourse 
lends itself to a heightened sophistication compared to the previous one, as the Frankfurt School 
argument emerges dialectically, with the limits of the Enlightenment having always remained for 
them dialectical, as the reason that dominates as pure calculation is at the same time linked to the 
possibility of a different and emancipatory reason. Their goal was to rescue reason in the hope 
that reason might change by brining instrumental reason (concerned with means and aims) to 
critical reflection (ends). 
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The third section of the paper, Ethics Rather Than Relativism, examines the theoretical 
shifts that have directed us in a poststructural/postmodern direction, in order to show how the 
work of Levinas can address the difficulties that have been identified with this theoretical 
position. This section outlines what can be understood as a turning away from the hegemony of 
structuralism to a poststructural/postmodern understanding of the world. Politically, this shift is 
described in chapter one through the events of May, 1968, in Paris. Theoretically, it is traced 
through the development of Ferdinand de Saussure’s linguistics to the turn in theory described 
through the discourse of the end of metanarratives by Jean-Francois Lyotard (1924-1998). Its 
intent is to contextualize the debates and discourses that define what has been described as a 
“post-metaphysical” age, a state of affairs where we can no longer subscribe to the pursuit of 
objective descriptions such as an unmediated real, to irrefutable truths or to the autonomous 
subject. The greatest challenge with respect to these developments has been suggestive of an 
ethical void. It is in the very refusal to ascribe to essences (to ask and know what something truly 
is in its manifestation), absolutes and totalities that we will turn to the work of Emmanuel 
Levinas who presents us with an understanding that is ethical precisely because of this refusal. 
Levinas provides us with a path that leads out of the ethical problematic that has plagued a 
poststructural/postmodern age where our theoretical categories have left behind, amongst other 
things, the self-determining will of the human individual as the measure of all things. 
It is in Section IV, In and Beyond Discourse, that the paper will provide some of the 
ideas of Levinas’s ethics of the Other and place these into a theoretical as well as a political 
context. The discussion will begin by outlining the phenomenological method as developed by 
Edmund Husserl and show how Levinas uses Martin Heidegger to move beyond Husserl while 
consequently moving beyond Heidegger as well. Further chapters in this section will proceed 
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using the terms and phraseology Levinas uses to shape his work. Our attempt to render 
Levinasian themes comes up against Levinas’s own problematic, rational activity is unable to 
step outside (transcend) the totalizing logic of metaphysical systems (referred to as ontology) 
without supposing or restoring them. Despite the impasse of the conceptual problematic of 
always being inside language, these terms will be appealed to, as they must be. It is in their 
insistence on the alterity of and responsibility toward the Other that we will hope to glimpse the 
long forgotten phenomenological description of the pre-original intersubjective encounter as the 
immediacy of the face-to-face, a passing instant, now deduced from principles long since 
abstracted from the approach of the Other. It is this ethical moment, an interruption of intentional 
consciousness from without, that the paper will attempt to bring into focus, and in this attempt it 
will ultimately fail, as it must. 
In similar fashion, it is in Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974) that Levinas’s 
writing is rendered performatively as he attempts to translate into ontological language what 
escapes conceptuality (ontology). While for Levinas, ethical responsibility for the other precedes 
political judgements, he does provide a way of developing the ethical relationship with the Other 
into the social and political domain and into a just society. While condemned to betrayal, the 
ontological (cognition/thematization) is haunted by the irreducible alterity of the infinite Other as 
a trace. What comes back to us as a trace retains the ethical moment, and it is in this return that 
the political aspect of the paper in the final chapter of this section hopes to show the 
development of Levinas’s views into the realm of justice. So, while Levinas’s writings are (in 
keeping with his phenomenological orientation) phenomenologically descriptive rather than 
proscriptive, to understand him politically is to bring ethics to justice as its very basis.  
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It is also my intent in this paper to speak about the view that proposes the applicability of 
Levinas’s reflections to nature as the non-human other (even though Levinas himself may not 
have agreed with this). With this in mind, the intention of Section V, The Discourse of the 
Environmental Movement is Based on the Ethical Relationship, is to stress the environmental 
movement as the return of the ethical trace in the political. This section of the paper will 
contextualize the environmental movement through a post-Levinasian lens. The movement as a 
political response to the call of nature addresses the continuing catastrophe of the destruction of 
species and ecosystems and the growing threat to the basic conditions essential to life. 
Addressing the non-human in a way that takes into account Levinasian responsibility is to 
presuppose the event of the encounter with the Other as a proto-ethical moment for which 
Levinas claims ethics as first philosophy (not a theory of ethics but an ethics of ethics before 
thinking). So, while the issue must begin from the Levinasian premise of a prior proto-ethical 
relationship of responsibility for the other that is based on inequality, non-reciprocity and 
asymmetry, placing an obligation on me that makes the other more than my equal, commanding 
and summonsing me from height and destitution, this “prior” (beyond time) begins the task of 
debate and action in the arena of the systemic and political, and I would add the environmental. 
These are the sites of totality where environmental studies and the environmental movement 
reside and where there is a responsibility to the whole world that must be negotiated. But 
everything rests on the ethical relationship.  
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Section II DISCOURSES REGARDING THE CONCEPTUAL ROOTS OF OUR 
ECOLOGICAL CRISIS 
 
2.0 The Critique of the Scientific Revolution as the Domination of Nature  
 The critique of the Scientific Revolution as the domination of nature imbues this event 
with responsibility for profoundly changing the relationship we have had with the natural world. 
It sees the most pronounced alteration between human beings and what we have defined as 
nature as a result of the shift from a religious medieval paradigm to a modern scientific-rational 
view of the world. Science did not, however, develop in a vacuum, but was itself a part of the 
intellectual project of the Enlightenment that was characterized by scepticism towards Church 
doctrines, individualism, a belief in science and the experimental method, the use of reason and 
critical thought, and a demand for freedom and political representation aimed toward human 
emancipation. Its main social and political outcome was the French Revolution. It was the 
Scientific Revolution that most significantly transformed our relationship to nature; its most 
influential and pervasive aspects were not its facts, but rather its new method of inquiry and its 
new criterion of truth, not as revelation, but as a true and accurate representation of reality 
(Randall 1976, 253). The new logic, what would in time come to be called modern science, 
developed as a slow and complex separation from many occult varieties of magic and alchemy 
that at the time were the primary alternatives to the power of the medieval church and state who 
together sanctioned a combination of Aristotelianism and Christian dogma (Kearney 1981, 35, 
47, 52; Leiss 1974, xi, 74, 75, 150). The move away from this authority required a break with the 
physical writings of Aristotle (384-322 BC) that were salvaged from the Arabs of Spain as the 
starting point for all apperceptions of reality that Thomas Aquinas (1224-1274) and others 
synthesized with Christian faith.  
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2.0.1  The Medieval World-View 
 Prior to the discourse of modern rationalism, a religious world-view explained the 
conditions of the time as residing in a heavenly sphere. It was during this period that the purpose 
of the search for knowledge of nature was not a search for the laws of nature, but consisted 
primarily in achieving knowledge of the divine will which underlay them: the will of God 
(Berman 1981, 51; Evernden 1992, 42). This made nature’s symbolic content far more 
significant than its material content, all reality possessing a signification which transcended the 
crudeness of mere material reality (Evernden 1992, 42). In the medieval view, knowing the 
material aspects of an object did not give access to the significant divine aspect of being; “to stop 
with things themselves” was to miss what mattered, the meaning and significance of things that 
gave purpose to existence (Ibid., 43-44). In this world, fact and value, epistemology and ethics, 
the good and the true were identical. “What do I know?” and “How should I live?” were 
indistinguishable questions (Berman 1981, 40, 51). In this world, knowledge of things, of nature, 
was not looked upon solely or even primarily with the aim of looking after the material needs of 
the human race, but served other needs as well (Harrison 1999, 91, 92). In this role, natural 
objects symbolized eternal verities, or taught important lessons concerning standards of moral 
behaviour (Ibid., 91). In this scheme of things nature was to be “known” in a richly symbolic 
way in order to determine spiritual and moral meaning (Ibid., 91). The image of nature as alive, 
sensitive, and female, particularly the conception of nature as a nurturing mother, imposed 
normative cultural constraints respecting the actions of humans on the Earth, while the 
metaphorical re-conceptualization of nature, begun with the advent of the Scientific Revolution, 
transformed a previously alive female nature into dead matter (Merchant 1983, 3, 4). Depriving 
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nature of any qualities beyond measurement meant that nature was open to be used without 
constraint (Berman 1981, 126; Harvey 1996, 134).1 
 
2.0.2 The New Scientific-Rational Method and World-View 
 The ideas and developments that culminated in the Scientific Revolution have been 
traced to the seventeenth century and the writings of Francis Bacon (1561-1626) and Rene 
Descartes (1596-1650), who were representative of the new scientific method. The violent shift 
in perspective each author was grappling with represented an epistemology that was 
revolutionary at the time but now is part of “the air we breathe” (Berman 1981, 29). It was Rene 
Descartes’s new method that conceived the world as composed of distinct subjects and knowable 
objects. The accurate identity between the subject and the object became the prerequisite for the 
knowledge of truth. Descartes, a rationalist, discounted human sense experience convinced of the 
certainty of the mathematical properties of nature believed, in the last analysis, that knowledge of 
nature depended on the progressive expunging of the mind from the phenomenal world, 
separating the thinker from the world that was confronted as nature in order to keep emotions 
from interfering with the judgments that form the basis of scientific knowledge. Human beings 
(essentially soul, consciousness, or “thinking substance”) were ontologically divorced from 
nature and their own physical bodies. Francis Bacon (writing some 17 years before Descartes) 
argued that the dominant philosophy of his time unwittingly projected false notions into nature, 
whereby human concerns were being read into the order of nature in an abstract manner. He 
proposed that this identification of human interests with the natural order had to be frustrated and 
                                                         
1 Common perceptions of the time saw the rocks of the earth as its bones, the rivers as veins, the 
forests as hair and the cicadas as dandruff (Berman 1981, 74). Similarly, a man’s face and hands 
were seen to resemble the soul to which they were joined, a concept retained in palmistry, even 
as it is practiced today (Ibid.). 
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once liberated from locating in nature the source of particular social and ethical standards, 
humanity would be able to develop a picture of nature’s modus operandi, thereby being able to 
fulfil human desires. The elimination of naturalistic categories means in this context that nature 
ceases to be a basis for limitations on the scope of human behaviour.2 With the end of human 
consciousness projecting itself into external nature in search for security and validation of 
standards of conduct, nature can be viewed as a generalized object of investigation, as a system 
of matter in motion – an object of conquest. The experience of being dominated by nature, by 
external standards grounded in nature, gave way to expressing the achievement of man’s 
domination over nature. Bacon’s empiricism, his description of scientific experimentation as 
“vexing nature” and his spirit of “enlarging the bounds of the human empire over nature” is 
viewed as representing our control and domination of nature (Best and Kellner 1997, 198; 
Randall 1976, 208). 
 When the new scientific-rational method was initially proposed, it shook the foundations 
of religion and ethics as well as those of the received science. Religion was expected to 
guarantee the responsible use of nature’s power, serving as the essential ground for science as a 
social enterprise (Leiss 1974, 196). Early proponents of the new science recognized this and 
relied on the presence of religion to ensure that an ethical void did not develop (Ibid., 194). 
Refuge in the faith of traditional religious dogmas eventually, however, also collapsed. 
Disenchantment and secularization replaced religion; its will to truth meant that the quest for 
                                                         
2An example can be taken from the art of metallurgy that was compared to obstetrics, ores 
perceived as growing in the womb of the earth like embryos (Berman 1981, 88). The miner or 
metalworker was therefore meddling in sacred territory and down to the fifteenth century the 
sinking of a new mine was accompanied by religious ceremonies including fasting, praying and a 
particular series of rituals in which miners engaged least the earth strike back against man for 
this incursion into its womb (Ibid., 88). These incursions were effected in a context which sought 
harmony with nature and where its mastery would have been regarded as a contradiction in terms 
(Ibid. p.98).   
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universal knowledge of the “real” world became the known or knowable world to a newly 
developing free and autonomous individual. This is a world that rejected God’s claim to 
determine human fate. The synthesis of the Christian-Aristotelian world-view in the Middle 
Ages, that saw the good and the true as identical, was irrevocably dismantled in the seventeenth 
century. With the rise of the scientific-rational world-view, facts were separated from values (the 
fact/value distinction) and epistemology from ethics (a shift from “why” to “how”) proclaiming 
the self-sufficiency of human reason, and abandoning the most solid ground on which moral 
instruction had rested (Docherty 1993, 10; Bauman 2004, 219). The “despiritualization” of 
nature, its steady weakening as a prescriptive force for humanity was held responsible for 
creating an ethical and ideational void (Leiss 1974, 185). This is an issue that emerged with the 
dawn of the Scientific Revolution, at which time the sacred and manipulative were split down the 
middle (Berman 1981, 99). The latter could survive in a context of profit, expanding technology, 
and secular salvation; in fact that was what the manipulative aspect was all about, severed from 
its religious basis (Ibid.).   
 The new framing of nature (the idea of nature being a deeply cultural historical construct) 
resulted in a conception of nature consisting entirely of extensional properties related to each 
other within a causal matrix (Brown 2003, 3, 7). This is a world that sees nature as valid in terms 
of its measurability, reducible to controllable mathematical laws, consequently disqualifying all 
that is not calculably verifiable as knowledge. Spearheaded as the Enlightenment project of 
demythologizing and disenchanting the world, in its most advanced stages this project was 
deployed by a positivism that originated with French philosophers Henri de-Saint-Simon (1760-
1825) and Auguste Comte (1798-1857) (Cahoone 2003, 5; Leiss 1974, 150). Positivism was 
marked by a rejection and abandonment of philosophy’s metaphysical musings and ethical 
13 
pretensions as not constitutive of knowledge advocating the scientific method as the only 
genuine form of true knowledge, because it alone was empirically verifiable. This position 
carried the campaign to the heart of conceptual thought, upholding the notion that only 
propositions conforming to one notion of verifiable knowledge – only observable phenomena 
and quantifiable verification using the objective scientific method could provide positive 
knowledge of the world or have any meaning. 
 
2.0.3 The Fate of the Good and the True 
The methodology of modern natural science became the model for making all objective 
judgments. The scientific-rational world-view split goodness off from truth. Goodness suffered 
two fates. Whatever fit into the scientific-rational frame of reference was conceptualized as 
“real” and “true” and therefore good. What was not able to meet this yardstick of “objectivity” 
was relegated to the realm of the merely subjective-relative and dismissed. In its grasp of the real 
as the true, the scientific-rational view of the world was able to abandon goodness. 
Secularization’s increasing commitment to rationalizing theories of goodness in terms of the 
concept of truth also led to another development. In this sense, the objectively scientific true 
becomes the good. In this vein, Nietzsche (1844-1900) proposed the reversed convergence of 
ethics and epistemology, “as the goodness that the latter finds in truth” seeing all truth as the 
“illusions which we have forgotten are illusions” (cited in Cohen 1986, 2).  
The result is the belief that scientific and technological achievement leads to ethical 
progress. This assumption relied on scientific knowledge to help humanity become morally 
enlightened. The Age of Enlightenment and Reason considered reason as an autonomous force, 
and it was hoped that this rationality would broaden into other domains improving the conditions 
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of social relationships (Leiss 1974, 21). The hope and dream was that control and mastery over 
nature may also be a major instrument of human self-control, a means of achieving rational 
intelligence in order to create moral and just societies (Ibid., 21). This has been a principle article 
of faith of modern Western civilization which has been stretched if not destroyed by the 
experiences of fascism, which have demonstrated how the civilized face of modernity is attended 
constantly by a barbarism which is its other side, requiring a total re-evaluation of the power and 
limits of reason, as reason is not inherently good (Docherty 1993, 12, 13; Leiss 1974, 21, 27). 
 
2.0.4 Closing Statements 
          The critique of the Scientific Revolution as laying the conceptual ground for the modern 
scientific-rational world-view sees the split between a self-certain isolated subject and a 
meaningless objective realm as responsible for our environmental devastation. When the split is 
described as the fact-value distinction it is typically invoked in the Western philosophy of ethics 
in order to avoid making the “naturalistic fallacy,” the attempt to draw ethical conclusions 
(normative values) from factual premises (or the other way around). It proposes that it is 
impossible to derive an “ought” from an “is,” values from facts. This is a denial of the belief that 
greater knowledge will lead to greater morality. Having theoretically separated facts and values 
and awakening the possibility (Kant (1724-1804) would say the necessity) that the realm of facts 
is split off from the realm of values, the Kantian move was a response to this split, and attempted 
to establish reason as the foundation of ethics (Davis 1996, 53; Docherty 1993, 10). 
           To call for the reintroduction of values (intrinsic or not) into our relationship with nature 
assumes their absence, asserting that the scientific-rational world-view inaugurated the 
distinction between facts and values, ethics and epistemology and is responsible for our current 
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relationship with respect to nature lends credence to the distinction when none necessarily exists, 
a pseudo-problem. The notion of the distinction has in fact somewhat collapsed. It was 
challenged by phenomenology as an attempt to think beyond the conceptual dichotomies of fact-
value (as well as mind/body/world), a critique of the subject/object difference. A recent 
challenge can be said to have emerged from the poststructural/postmodern disillusionment with 
the correspondence of thought and object model of reality, weakening the hold that the scientific 
method has had in its insistence that as an activity it approximated more and more closely the 
truth in nature. The work of Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996), originating in the philosophy of science, 
can be cited as contributing to the disenchantment of science with his publication, The Structure 
of Scientific Revolutions (1962), challenging the notion that science was not subject to narrative, 
and shaking the foundations of scientific certainty. Even though the social sciences have been 
seen as interpretive in searching for meaning, thereby being perceived as different from the 
natural sciences, it has been Kuhn’s contention that the difference is a misconception (Bird 2000, 
268-269; Kellner and Roderick 1981, 161). In spite of the fact that for the most part the scientific 
community has stubbornly attempted to retain its hold on the facts as distinct from values by 
charging the philosophy of science with “excessive postmodernism” in Kuhn’s work, he has 
nonetheless been influential in making the point that even our scientific facts are derived from 
values. Kuhn’s position and his influence is captured by the following statement,  
[This] distinction disappears once we realize that the logical empiricists sold us a bill of 
goods about natural science. Once we awaken from our positivist slumbers we realize 
that none of these features hold of natural science either. The two turn out to be one, not 
for the positivist reason that there is no rational place for hermeneutics; but for the 
radically opposite reason that all sciences are equally hermeneutic (Kellner and Roderick 
1981, 162).  
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The same can be said for the call of values to be re-infused into our relationship with nature, the 
distinction never applied, it was constructed and structured so, and to call for its reversal is in 
some sense to presuppose it. 
 
2.1 The Frankfurt School Critique of Reason as the Domination of Nature 
To the Enlightenment, that which does not reduce to numbers, and ultimately to the one, 
becomes illusion; modern positivism writes it off as literature ... What men want to learn 
from Nature is how to use it in order wholly to dominate it and other men (Horkheimer 
and Adorno 1999, 4-6, 7). 
 
The goal of Habermas’s project can be expressed in one sentence: to prevent social 
relations from becoming like our relations with the natural world (Eckersley 1992, 108). 
 
While the tradition of the early Institute for Social Research, known as the Frankfurt School, 
refused to utter a positive theory of the normative, this reticence has been cited as anything but a 
moral deficiency in their unique neo-Marxian unwillingness to speculate on the final form of 
what might be called “the moral” (Horowitz 2000, 295-296). David Harvey has credited the 
Institute with “the frontal attack upon the ideology of domination of nature” (Harvey 1996, 33). 
The critiques of the Frankfurt School – particularly Theodore Adorno, Max Horkheimer, and 
Herbert Marcuse – to the discourses of man and nature were innovative and provocative opening 
up a proliferating trail of thought that has remained persistent and influential (Ibid.). 3 
 The early Frankfurt School saw the “struggle for existence” and the structuring 
objectivization of the object we practice via concepts, not as a result of the Scientific Revolution 
or the modern period but as a prior existence. Horkheimer, in the Eclipse of Reason (1947) states 
                                                         
3 It is important to note that the Critical Theory of the Institute of Social Research was never a 
fully articulated philosophy applied similarly by members of the Institute. Rather, it consisted of 
shared assumptions, which distinguished their approach from bourgeois or “traditional” theory 
(Buck-Morss 1977, 65). 
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that the domination of nature, or the expansion of human power in the world, was a universal 
characteristic of human reason, rather than a distinctive mark of the modern period exemplified 
by the development of methodological science and its coupling with technological progress 
(Horkheimer 1974, 176).4 He comments that, 
The disease of reason is that reason was born from man’s urge to dominate nature ... One 
might say that the collective madness that ranges today, from the concentration camps to 
the seemingly most harmless mass-culture reactions, was already present in germ in 
primitive objectivization, in the first man’s calculating contemplation of the world as 
prey (Ibid.). 
 
For Horkheimer, objectivization is a universal that has existed as a tool through which the 
chaotic, disorganized data of sensations and perception become organized into coherent 
structures that give rise to exact knowledge (Leiss 1974, 143, 148). Thinking “the object” does 
not solely hinge on the advent of the modern period or capitalism, having been a possibility of 
natural-historical life and a condition of human self-preservation (Jarvis 1998, 167). We seek 
clear distinctions and categories which structuralists view as a normal attribute of the human 
mind (Evernden 1986, 37). Separating “nature” and “society” is an act as old as human society 
itself, reflective of the logical structure of the mind with its need to form categories out of 
continua, to release us from the confusion of the background (Evernden 1986, 37; Leiss 1974, 
xii). This process is repeatedly re-engaged as a useful common denominator with respect to how 
we think. Yet, the separation of society and nature is for the most part an illusion; nature and 
culture are intertwined, there are no concepts of “pure” nature and “pure” culture; nature in 
Woodsworth’s phrase “rolls through all things” (cited in Llewelyn 1991, 116). The true character 
of social development is but a series of increasingly more complex states of nature, with human 
activity a constitutive factor in the evolutionary process (Jarvis 1998, 33; Leiss 1974, xii). 
                                                         
4 It should be noted that critical theorists were never against science or technology per se, rather 
they were against scientism (the conviction that empiric-analytic science is the only valid access 
to knowledge) and the dominance of instrumental reason (Eckersley 1992, 51, 153). 
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 Horkheimer’s comment also addresses a direct universal relationship between our 
existence – our pragmatic need to survive – and our need to take from nature. In every historical 
period man has pursued a struggle with nature in order to ensure survival and maintain existence 
(Leiss 1974, 106). Attempts to “dominate” the environment occur in the sense that the 
environment’s usefulness must be regarded in relation to existence (Ibid.). It may be said that, “ 
... men wage a kind of warfare against the natural environment by way of [a] response to the 
pressures of the struggle for existence” (Ibid., 143).5 For Adorno and Horkheimer there was no 
time “before” domination. Similarly, this relationship existed prior to capitalism, and appears 
likely to them to survive the demise of capitalism. For Adorno and Horkheimer, class domination 
existed before capitalist class domination. Ending capitalism with its property relations might not 
itself secure an end to domination, which appeared likely to continue and intensify after 
capitalism ended (Harvey 1996, 133; Jarvis 1998, 28). For Horkheimer and Adorno, the disease 
is not capitalism but Western reason itself (McGowan 1991, 95).  
                                                         
5 Nietzsche was of the opinion that the one thing that characterizes all human beings is the drive 
to dominate the environment (Stumpf 1971, 380). This drive, which is central to human nature is 
The Will to Power (Ibid.). But for Nietzsche, this will to power is more than the will to survive, 
it is an inner drive to express a vigorous affirmation of all of man’s powers evidenced by 
Nietzsche’s statement that, “the strongest and highest Will to Life does not find expression in a 
miserable struggle for existence, but in a Will to War. A Will to Power, a Will to Overpower!” 
(Ibid.) Moral values were to be built upon the true nature of man and his environment, not upon 
the “life-denying negativeness of the Christian ethics” (Ibid., 379, 384). It was the internal power 
within man, “a power which uses and exploits the environment,” exploitation viewed not as a 
depraved act, but belonging to “the nature of the living being as a primary function” (Ibid., 381, 
384). Exploitation was the “consequence of the intrinsic Will to Power, which is precisely the 
Will to Life – a fundamental fact of all history ... ” (Ibid.). Nietzsche found his affirmation of life 
in Homer’s gods – Dionysus (representing no restraints or barriers, defying all limitations) and 
Apollo (as the symbol of order, restraint and form) – their fusion was symbolized in the power of 
man to create beauty through art. This fusion could provide modern culture with a relevant and 
workable standard of behaviour at a time when religious faith was unable to provide a 
compelling vision of man’s destiny (Ibid. p.378, 379). Nietzsche’s ideal became the passionate 
man who had his passions under control (Ibid. p.385). 
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 At the same time, the ecological contradictions of capitalism, the demand that 
corporations maximize profits, does not and cannot be concerned with ecological capacity. The 
ecological struggle has increasingly been described as coming into conflict with the laws that 
govern the capitalist system: the laws of the extraction of surplus value and the maximization of 
profit. Michael Bosquet put it well when he said, “the ecological logic is purely and simply the 
negation of capitalist logic; the earth can’t be saved within the framework of capitalism, the 
Third World can’t be developed according to the model of capitalism” (cited in Marcuse 1996, 
53).6 The environmental crisis, as the “quintessential crisis of capitalism” (the phrase belongs to 
the late Rudolf Bahro (1935-1997), co-founder of the West German Green Party), has been 
explored through a critique of the externalization of costs as yet a further contradiction of 
capitalism (cited in Eckersley 1992, 19). Continuing shifts within capitalism itself have also 
necessitated self-reflection on the part of Marxism with elements within Marxism attempting to 
come to terms with ecological challenges. Bahro and Gorz began to rethink issues of growth and 
sustainable development. Daniel Cohn-Bendit (a French-German politician and student leader 
during the May, 1968, riots in France) began a movement from red to green that maintained 
emancipatory ideals with respect to humanity, while tempering them with the necessary 
cohabitation between humanity and the rest of nature (Docherty 1993, 4). 
 
2.1.1 Domination of Outer Nature, Inner Nature and Others 
 
 It was, however, primarily with the writings of Adorno and Horkheimer that my 
understanding was furthered and broadened beyond capitalism as the cause of the crisis of 
nature. This took place as a result of their identification of the inescapable compulsion to the 
                                                         
6 Michael Bosquet is the pen name for Andre Gorz an Austrian social philosopher living in 
France. 
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social domination of nature as the essential feature of Western reason, as well as with their 
replacement of the orthodox Marxist emphasis on class struggle as the motor of history with 
what they perceived as the equally important connection between two aspects of domination: the 
domination of nature and the domination of “man,” directed at others as well as the self. 
Domination was recognized by Critical Theory as assuming a range of non-economic guises, 
including the subjugation of women and cruelty to animals, matters overlooked by most 
orthodox Marxists (Eckersley 1996, 101). As Horkheimer and Adorno argued, the domination of 
nature goes together with self-domination and social domination, including the domination of 
human beings, in a subject/object dialectic. What we have inflicted on nature we have in turn 
imposed on each other and ourselves, dominating our impulses by way of instinctual 
renunciation and self-denial. Mastery of inner nature is a logical correlate to the mastery of 
external nature since “the domination of the world presupposes a condition under which man’s 
reason is already master in its own house, that is, in the domain of human nature” (Leiss cited in 
Merchant 1996, 59). Essentially, the first wave of critical theorists argued that the domination of 
outer nature necessitated a similar domination of inner nature attained by the repression and 
renunciation of the instinctual, aesthetic and expressive aspects of our being (Eckersley 1992, 
102). Gaining control over the natural environment necessitates mechanisms of control over the 
individual’s wayward impulses, as well as over the general populace, of which the culture 
industry is, for Horkheimer and Adorno, only the latest representative of social control 
(McGowan 1991, 18-19). However, the domination of external nature by internal nature extracts 
a cost: it does not go un-resisted (Merchant 1996, 4). The unrestrained ab/use of external nature 
destroys its own conditions for continuation, just as the repression of human emotions – the tight 
rein extended over repressed instinctual demands, including aesthetic and expressive aspects of 
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our being – leads not to happiness, but to a greater potential for rebellion (Eckersley 1996, 70; 
Merchant 1996, 4). Termed “the return of the repressed” by Freud and “the revolt of nature” by 
Horkheimer, in the “totally administered world” of late capitalism the repressed returns in the 
barbarous and (ir)rational form of fascism, while internal revolt rebels psychically, spiritually, 
and bodily, with external nature revolting ecologically (Callinicos 1994, 10; Merchant 1996, 4).  
 
2.1.2 The Dialectic of Myth and Reason 
 In The Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944), written with an acute awareness of the material 
and historical realities of fascism and Nazism, Horkheimer and Adorno set themselves the task 
of “discovering why mankind, instead of entering into a truly human condition, was sinking into 
a new kind of barbarism” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1999, xi). Composed “when the end of the 
Nazi terror was in sight,” The Dialectic, so named in order to emphasize the flux between 
mimesis and enlightenment, not only proposes that “Enlightenment is totalitarian,” but that “the 
fully enlightened earth radiates disaster triumphant” and is a text that asks for an explanation for 
“evil in the world” in a supposedly progressive history (Ibid., 3).7  
 Horkheimer and Adorno argued that while the development of instrumental reason 
promises the subject autonomy from the forces of nature, it acts only to enslave the subject again 
by its own repression of its impulses and inclinations: its own nature. Not only is nature 
conquered, but the body is subordinated to the mind, the unconscious repressed (Berman 1981, 
132). Horkheimer and Adorno state, “It is not merely that domination is paid for by the 
alienation of men from the objects dominated: with the objectification of spirit, the very relations 
of men – even those of the individual to himself – were bewitched” (Horkheimer and Adorno 
1999, 28). The Frankfurt School challenged the hegemony of instrumental rationality, that 
                                                         
7 Mimesis as an attempt to become like nature through an identification/imitation of it. 
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branch of human reason that is concerned with apprehending the instrumental value of 
phenomena and that is supposed to deliver humankind from want and suffering in its equation of 
reason, emancipation and progress (Eckersley 1992, 98). Horkheimer and Adorno saw this 
position as inadequate, failing to acknowledge the other dark side of reason, as well as its 
limitations (Best and Kellner 1997, 7). Horkheimer and Adorno did not radically separate 
“ancient” and “modern” as categories; they did not view enlightenment as designating a 
particular historical period. Their position was not anti-Enlightenment. The focus of The 
Dialectic was the investigation of the self-destruction of the Enlightenment, while always 
maintaining the dialectical position that reason might change (Jarvis 1998, 30; Luke 1988, 77). 
Their stance was that “the Enlightenment must consider itself” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1999, 
xv). Their critique of enlightenment was intended to prepare the way for a positive notion of 
enlightenment in order to release it from entanglement in blind domination (Ibid., xvi).  
 Horkheimer and Adorno critiqued rationalism, especially the Cartesian version of 
mathematical reason that dominated as pure calculation holding up reason as the “essential 
substance” of human life. This reason claimed absolute knowledge of reality, the ability to dispel 
ambiguity and unclarity, replacing them with the transparency of logic and truth (Best and 
Kellner 1997, 7; Docherty 1993, 8). Horkheimer and Adorno detail how the Enlightenment, in its 
drive to this absolute reason, systematically extirpated animism and mythological thinking 
through a series of related intellectual and practical operations presented as demythologizing, 
secularizing or disenchanting nature and the world through the progressive applications of reason 
(Docherty 1993, 5; Jarvis 1998, 22, 24; Luke 1988, 72). While enlightenment is traditionally 
viewed as the emancipation of man from the despotism of myth, fear and superstition, 
Horkheimer and Adorno see it as far less straightforward or emancipatory, since enlightenment 
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can be as totalitarian as any system (Docherty 1993, 5; Horkheimer and Adorno 1999, 24; 
Lenhardt 1976, 36). They are more inclined to view it dialectically, as emancipating while also 
mythic in its claims to absolute knowledge. Horkheimer and Adorno elaborate two theses: their 
double perspective is that myth is already enlightenment; and enlightenment reverts to 
mythology, “which it never really knew how to elude” (Horkheimer and Adorno 1999, xvi, 11-
12, 27, 31). For them, reason is actually mythical rather than fully rational because it suppresses 
rather than reflects on its own relation to myth and tradition. Their analysis of the “dialectic of 
enlightenment” refers to the ways in which supposedly enlightened rational thought contains 
traces of myth and irrationality, which in turn contain a rational core. Horkheimer and Adorno 
argue that as modes of knowing, myth, magic and ritual anticipate scientific domination (Luke 
1988, 76).8 If human reason is a universal characteristic, myth provides explanation and was 
already characterized by the discipline and power that Bacon celebrated as the “right mark” 
(Horkheimer and Adorno 1999, 8).  
 For Horkheimer and Adorno, reason has been reduced to a specific form of reason, 
presented as the only valid or legitimate form of rational thinking and reducing material realities 
into rational concepts, ideally into a form amenable to mathematization (Docherty 1993, 6). 
Reason becomes no more than the language of logic and mathematics, which translates reality 
into reason’s own terms, while non-conceptual reality gets lost in the translation, escaping 
consciousness entirely (Ibid.). A mathematical consciousness thus produces the world, not 
                                                         
8 Morris Berman reiterates this thesis in The Re-enchantment of the World (1981) claiming that 
ironically, alchemy and magic were decisive in preparing the ground for the scientific method 
because they were engaged in rational attempts to control natural processes. Magic and mimesis 
represent a time of undifferentiated unity where the subject has no identity apart from nature, but 
not before rationality or domination (Jarvis 1998, 30, 31; Lenhardt 1976, 39). Mythic reasoning 
is actually an operationalist mode of thinking, mediating people’s fears surrounding self-
preservation by efforts to control or influence nature (Luke 1988, 77). 
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unexpectedly, as mathematics. What concerned Horkheimer and Adorno was that under the “sign 
of Enlightenment” the subject’s engagement with the world would be “rational” only in the most 
purely formal sense of the word (Ibid., 8). They were concerned that what should be a political 
engagement that involves the subject in a process of intellection or critical thinking could be 
reduced to a ritual of thinking, a formal appearance of thinking that would manifest itself as a 
legitimation, not of a perception of the world, but of the analytical modes of mathematical reason 
itself (Ibid.). The disturbance of the subject proposed by an engagement with a materially 
different Other would be reduced to a confirmation of the aesthetic beauty and the validity of the 
process of mathematical reason, a process of reason that reduces the subject to an engagement 
with and a confirmation of its own rational processes (Ibid.). In Horkheimer and Adorno’s 
words, “Mathematical procedure became, so to speak, the ritual of thinking” (Horkheimer and 
Adorno 1999, 25). 
 While critical of instrumental rationality (purposive procedural means and ends that serve 
the subject’s interest in relation to the assumed reasonableness of self-preservation) Horkheimer 
and Adorno, in their dialectical way, believed that the reason that dominates as pure calculation 
is at the same time linked to the possibility of a different and emancipatory reason. Their goal 
was to rescue and reconcile reason, to bring instrumental “subjective” reason to “objective” or 
“critical” reason, a reason that engages in critical reflection beyond appearances to a deeper 
reality concerned with the reasonableness of ends of objective truths. Here “an aim can be 
reasonable for its own sake … without reference to some kind of subjective gain or advantage” 
(Horkheimer 1974, 4). Historically, objective critical reason did not preclude subjective reason, 
but regarded it “as only a partial, limited expression of a universal rationality” (Ibid.). This state 
of affairs existed before the “eclipse or crisis of reason” occurred, transfiguring reason into a 
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subjective faculty of the mind, a notion where the subject alone can genuinely have reason (Ibid., 
5, 7). Reason, rather than being “a principle inherent in reality,” a focus on concepts such as the 
idea of the greater good and the problem of human destiny, at some point becomes the exclusive 
realization of a purpose (an aim) (Ibid.). Horkheimer and Adorno defended reason from the 
Romantics (those who reacted against the rigidity of abstract rationalism) and from those who 
asserted its epistemological supremacy (positivists). Their goal was to foster a mutual critique of 
these two forms of reason in order to reconcile them, similar to their wish for our 
“reconciliation” with nature.  
 
2.1.3 The Voyage of Odysseus 
 There has been an internal, logical connection between aspects of domination throughout 
their historical development (Leiss 1974, xiv). The classic image of the entanglements of 
domination, an allegory for the dialectic of enlightenment, is portrayed by Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s treatment of Homer’s Odysseus, contained in Book XII of the Odyssey, which tells of 
the encounter with the Sirens.9 The song of the Sirens contained in the Odyssey reflects the break 
between the subject and the object, the song representing the time before differentiation. It holds 
an irresistible allure, a promise of pleasure, which no one who hears it can escape. The Siren’s 
song has not yet been rendered powerless by reduction to the condition of art. Odysseus knows 
of only two ways to save himself and his men, and so he cunningly plugs the ears of his crew 
with wax to keep them from temptation. The other possibility he reserves for himself; he has 
himself strapped to the mast so that while he can feel the blind compulsion of nature, he is 
                                                         
9 Developments in the West have called forth re-readings of the West’s philosophical tradition, 
offering a genealogy for current conditions by finding in reason almost from the start the 
tendencies that have led to the present. (McGowan 1991, 95-96) Adorno and Horkheimer locate 
the fall in the Odyssey, whereas Nietzsche and Heidegger usually reserve this role for Socrates as 
the villain (Ibid., 96). 
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bound, unable to yield to self-abandonment and enact his desire. Bound by chains, Odysseus 
feels the tension between his desire for emancipation from nature and the urge to regress to pre-
rational pleasure (Lenhardt 1976, p.44). While his men know only of the song’s danger but 
cannot experience any of its beauty, for Odysseus escape forces an existence separate from 
nature, grounded in the inescapable compulsion toward the social domination of nature. 
Odysseus’s escape epitomizes the break with the enchanted past of myth and mimesis the 
struggle in the ancient world to overcome the imitation of nature and immersion in the pleasures 
of animal life in order to develop a sense of self as distinct from the external natural world 
(Merchant 1996, 3). Odysseus is able to break the hold of the mythic past and control his animal 
instincts and thus himself as well as his men, his wife, and other women, but the cost is 
alienation from his own emotions, bodily pleasures, other human beings, and nature itself (Ibid.). 
 
2.1.4 Closing Statements 
 An awareness of the existence of thematic affinities between Critical Theory (in 
particular the work of Adorno) and poststructural/ postmodern styles of thought has led to it 
being viewed as a prelude to this theoretical development. Adorno’s work has also been claimed 
as congruent “in its formal structure” with the work of Emmanuel Levinas.10 Similarities to 
                                                         
10 Hent de Vries’s Minimal Theologies: Critiques of Secular Reason in Adorno and Levinas 
(German original published in 1989 with the English translation published in 2005) claims that 
the appearance of secularism in philosophy contains an unacknowledged entanglement with 
religion that he explores through the work of Adorno, Levinas and others. He claims that 
Adorno’s dialectical critique (negative dialects) of dialectics and Levinas’s phenomenological 
(post phenomenological) critique of phenomenology resemble each other formally in their 
attempt to locate a transcendent dimension that places the subject in demand, or for Levinas 
obligates the subject. Asher Horowitz also stages a conversation between Levinas and Adorono 
in his article “’By a hair’s breadth’ Critique, transcendence and the ethical in Adorno and 
Levinas” published in 2002. For Horotwitz the similarities between Levinas and Adorno seem to 
consist in their search for the ethical and their difficulty (possibly the impossibility) of having 
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Levinas stem from Adorno’s critique of the epistemological tendency toward identity (what 
something is) and totality in its affinity with domination, and his negative dialectics as a critique 
of identity thinking demonstrating the non-identity of the subject and the object, the universal 
and the particular, pursued by him as a way of endowing the thinking mind with a dimension of 
radical otherness. Adorno’s thinking was imbued with the quest for a non-dominating form of 
cognition according to which the repressed other, the non-identical, the singular as pure alterity 
can be thought. His writings express guilt with respect to the harm that has been done to the non-
identical and contains an ethical dimension according to which the other can be thought non-
violently. While questions of reason and rationality pervade Adorno’s thought, it is the status of 
concepts and conceptuality that is the principle object of analysis of his main works. For Adorno, 
an expanded and changed concept of reason means expanding the scope and character of 
cognition, of knowing. His ethics is derived from the notion of conceptual thinking itself, ethics 
pursued through hyper-cognitive means.  
 While the major concepts (ethics) and arguments that Adorno (identity/negative 
dialectics) and Levinas (totality/post-phenomenology) examine and critique may be similar, the 
difficulty in claiming Adorno as more than a prelude for poststructuralism/postmodernism as 
well as for Levinasian thought is that the differences that distinguish them are more pervasive 
than their similarities. While the non-identical figured prominently in Adorno’s thinking, his 
search for ethics in cognition differs radically from Levinas’s critique wherein cognition reduces 
and assimilates alterity to the same. Levinas’s phenomenological ethical event is presented as a 
pre-cognitive experience, existing “before” we think or are consciously aware. Preservation of 
Marxist terminology as well as the retention of the concepts of ideology, reification, use-value 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
access to an outside point from which to speak. For both authors the affiliations appear to be at 
the highest level of abstraction. 
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and truth, distinguishes Critical Theory’s perspective from that of 
poststructuralism/postmodernism as well as Levinas’s project. The Frankfurt School critique of 
the limits of Enlightenment reason, the logic of identity and totality remained for them a 
dialectical (even though negative) and immanent critique rather than one invested in 
transcendence (yet there was always a search/desire/need to escape metaphysics and find a 
transcendent outside. Adorno’s attempt at transcendence resulted in the move to negative 
dialectics). The lack of similarity between the neo-Marxist Frankfurt School principals and 
Levinas the phenomenologist can also be seen from the lack of mutual recognition and 
acknowledgement they gave each other even though they were contemporaries (Adorno, 1903-
1969; Horkheimer 1895-1973; Marcuse 1898-1979; Levinas 1906-1995).  
 Congruence between some of the theorists of the Frankfurt School and Levinas emerges 
from the fact that their work is in many ways a response to the Shoah. It is in their experience of 
being the Jewish Other during Nazi fascism’s rise to power that is contained a mutual 
biographical component addressed in their theoretical writings. For Critical Theory this emerged 
with the principle of the non-identical as a way to end the domination, assimilation, exclusion 
and annihilation of the other. It is here that they meet in their search for the primacy of ethics 
over epistemology and ontology.  
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Section III  ETHICS RATHER THAN RELATIVISM 
3.0  Transformations  
The world has shifted, whether or not we appreciate or approve of its mutations (Dear 
1997, 67). 
 
All twentieth-century philosophy, aside from positivism, rejects the hegemony of science. 
This is the very contemporaneity of contemporary thought and the deepest sense of its 
“postmodernity” (Cohen 2001, 3). 
 
There seem to be some important new developments in the world that deserve consideration and 
articulation. These events and reformulations have affected all academic disciplinary fields, areas 
of culture and thought, as well as economic and political conditions. The new social movements 
that have emerged, including the environmental movement, distinguish themselves from a class-
based analysis, described by Marxists as the restructuring of national to transnational capitalist 
economies (Best and Kellner 1997, 30). Sociologically, the situation has been described as the 
transformation from industrialism to a postindustrial society in which informationalism is the 
technological basis of economic activity and social organization (Castells 2000, 5). It has also 
been formulated as a decomposition in the idea of the totality of society, a shift from a concern 
with the study of social systems to a study of sociological actors in the context of culturalism. 
Political economists have depicted the shift as a means of forestalling crisis using the language 
of the French regulation theorists. In the new post-Fordist society, the modern Fordist form of 
capitalist society marked by mass production and consumption, state regulation of the economy, 
and a homogenous mass culture has been replaced by more flexible modes of sociopolitical and 
economic regulation.11 The most important factors in creating the shifts and changes in the 
                                                         
11 Regulation theory has theorized the nature of the current globalization of multinational capital 
in a restructuring world order as the ability of capitalism to be consistently adaptable in 
forestalling crisis. The demise of the Fordist post-World War II social compromise has given 
way to the emergence of new social modes of economic regulation (Peck and Tickell 1994, 285). 
These modes of regulation are generated in, and function through, social norms and habits, 
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present moment are the experiences and effects of new technologies, intimately bound up with 
globalization and the vicissitudes of transnational capitalism (Best and Kellner 1997, 13). These 
factors are also part of the source of the global social and environmental crisis. In examining the 
turn in theory that has occurred, I do not want to leave unacknowledged the fact that intellectual 
shifts must be contextualized as part of the broader social patterns and movements in society and 
history that influence changes in culture and thought; I also want to avoid a reductive 
determinism that reduces ideas to economic or technological forces (Ibid., xi, xii). 
   
3.0.1 The Turn in Politics 
 The political turn in question began to recognize that domination was not going to be 
overturned by changes in state power or economic relations (congruent with the opinions of 
Critical Theory). It came to be recognized that a critique of social injustice from the standpoint 
of an orthodox Marxist class analysis was limited. The recognition arose that a multitude of 
forms of power and domination existed not only in the realm of labour but in all our institutions, 
our culture and our everyday life (Ibid., 10). The theme of the exploitation of labour and class 
solidarity shifted to the new social movements including feminism, gay rights, various struggles 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
customs and networks, moral codes, political and sociocultural institutions and practices, and 
reflect compromises representing a set of codified social relations which act to ensure and sustain 
the accumulation process on behalf of a regime of accumulation (Peck and Tickell 1994, 284; 
Painter 1995, 277-278). When these mechanisms come together in particular combinations, a 
social regulation is said to be operative, holding back crisis tendencies endemic to capitalism, 
and thereby keeping the system operative (Lauria 1997, 6, 209). The rise of new reconfigurations 
has been instrumental as an explanatory tool illustrative of an emerging order based on 
flexibility, structural competitiveness and supply-side regulation. Regulation theory has also 
theorized a changing state inclined towards the conflictual and contradictory character of the 
state, allowing politics to engage the state (albeit a radically different polity) as a possible ally 
with regard to progressive agendas. The emerging post-Fordist state is a reconfigured site of 
local negotiation and bargaining. 
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around race and ethnicity as well as the environmental movement, distinguishing themselves 
from a class-based analysis and politics (Ibid.). 
 French radical intellectuals, activists, and theorists gave up the idea that social 
transformation would emerge from mass struggle and revolutionary upheaval contained in many 
Marxist critiques of capitalism (Louis Althusser’s version of scientific structuralist Marxism 
dominated the political discourse of the time), postulating instead that it would emerge through 
developments in the economy, technology, culture and society (Ibid., 5).12   Marxist structuralism 
began to be perceived as totalizing and reductive; its visions of revolution and emancipation 
began to be rejected as totalizing and ineffective. This reorientation was due in large part to the 
failures of 1960s radicalism, the reality of Stalinism and the betrayal of the Communist Party in 
France in 1968. Rather than support students and workers who stood on the verge of 
overthrowing the state, support was provided for de Gaulle’s call for a return to normalcy, a 
conformist position that facilitated the return of the president to power and restored the status 
quo, crushing all hope and deeply disappointing those who had expectations for the triumph of 
revolution (Best and Kellner 1997, 5; Cahoone 2003, 4). In short, after the revolution in Paris 
failed in May, 1968, how does one then proceed to ground an emancipatory politics (Docherty 
1993, 35)? Reacting to the communist accommodation following the political upheaval, 
numerous French radicals came to associate Marxism with communist bureaucracy (Best and 
Kellner 1997, 5). Stalinism came to be viewed as a totalitarian failure of Marxism, leading to a 
                                                         
12 It is important to note that feminism and the social struggles of the civil rights movement 
contributed to the epistemological reformulations that the poststructural/postmodern shift in 
theory is about. Feminists began to question the category “woma/en” as a homogeneous totality 
while tensions in the civil rights struggle similarly began to pull at the construction of the whole. 
Tensions surrounding racism, sexism, classism and homophobia in the various social struggles 
began to call the categorizations themselves into question making it quite apparent that neither 
uniformity nor a singular “truth” was a part of any struggle. One of the texts that captured these 
rearticulations well for me was This Bridge Called My Back: Writings by Radical Women of 
Color (1981) edited by Cherrie Morga and Gloria Anzaldua.  
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search for new theories and politics. The disappointment and loss of hope in Marxism led to 
references about poststructuralism, in its French origins, as “the abandonment of Marxism by the 
disillusioned children of 1968” and “the wayward child of Marxism, a generation’s sense that it 
is orphaned” (Best and Kellner 1997, 5; Cahoone 2003, 5). 
 
3.0.2 The Turn in Theory  
 Structuralism as a method of analysis was originally developed by the Swiss linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and was published posthumously in 1916 as Course in 
General Linguistics by his students from their notes. Saussure’s contention was that language is 
a self-sufficient system of signs (not related to outside objects or ideas) where difference makes 
identity possible as differential relations among terms (i.e., the production of meaning is created 
inside language in the difference between words). From its beginnings as an analysis of the 
formal invariant properties of language, it was broadened in the mid-twentieth century by the 
French anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and others, who propelled it into various disciplinary 
fields where its insights were developed. That development has translated out to mean that the 
human activities of perception, meaning and thought are not natural but constructed. 
Structuralism centred on the underlying deep universal patterns and structures of the human 
mind and the way in which it classifies things in the social world. The key to understanding 
human existence for structuralism is to be found in the study of abstract relations within systems 
(Cahoone 2003, 4). As such, it advocated a scientifically objective and comprehensive 
theoretical focus on structures that make the individual, or rather the subject, what he or she is. It 
rejected Enlightenment humanism and existentialism with their emphasis on individual human 
consciousness and choice, in favour of a portrayal of the self as a construct of systems. It 
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maintains the primacy of wholes over parts, privileging abstract social structures, patterns and 
institutions over individual agency and responsibility (Best and Kellner 1997, 33; Jay 1984, 388, 
389). An adherence to universal timeless structures cancels out history. Unlike a humanist 
rendering that would depict the author as the creator/originator of the text, structuralism views 
the author as inhabiting pre-existing structures of language, originality misperceived as 
recombination. Structuralism has been described as, “Thought without thinkers” as it tends to 
dispense with the individual altogether (Auzias cited in Kurzweil 1980, 228-229).  
 The original proponents of the shift away from a structuralist (language) orientation were 
schooled in the theoretical movement of structuralism, developing poststructuralism (discourse) 
both as an extension and a putting-into-question of the premises and limitations of structuralism. 
It was a move away from its attempt at the realization of a totality, fixed or closed signification, 
rigid schemes as well as scientific and objective claims (to origins), yet it maintained the view of 
the structuralist subject as “an outdated humanist illusion” (Davis 1996, 2). The concept of the 
individual developed in the Renaissance as a unified, rational, autonomous and self-transparent 
agent of history was abandoned, regarded as “possibly no more than an effect of language,” 
culturally and discursively created. Disruptions in the concept of structure as a stable system 
found texts to have not one but several contradictory signifying systems. While the structuralist 
project studied underlying structures in their search for the truth “behind” or “within” a text, 
poststructuralists considered the underlying structures themselves as culturally constructed 
requiring an analysis and study of systems of knowledge in order to understand how knowledge 
(i.e., truth) itself is produced historically. Thus truth loses its finality, poststructuralism stressing 
the fragmentary, heterogeneous and plural character of reality, denying human thought the ability 
to arrive at any objective account of that reality (Callinicos 1994, 2). This reorientation provides 
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for a wider range of options in the possibility of multiple meanings and narratives. If one had to 
find a common denominator among figures in the poststructuralist category it would have to be 
their rejection of totalizing (a single explanatory concept), essentialist (a reality that exists 
independent of, beneath or beyond language and ideology) and foundationalist concepts 
(signifying systems are stable and unproblematic representations). These rejections have led to a 
certain crisis in theory delineated more fully below.  
  
3.0.3 The Seeming Crisis 
 It was primarily Jean-Francois Lyotard who, with his book The Postmodern Condition: A 
Report on Knowledge (1979, not translated into English till 1984) who pursued the 
poststructuralist argument and analysed knowledge in terms of narratives of how we understand 
the world, providing a certain definitive status in discussions of the postmodern (Bertens 1995, 
112; Malpas, 2005, 36). For Lyotard, the term “modern” involved “any science that legitimates 
itself with reference to a metadiscourse making an explicit appeal to some grand narrative,” 
examples of which would be master narratives of progress, socialism or knowledge. The 
postmodern, by contrast, was defined as an incredulity toward “metanarratives” (subscription to 
a prevailing theory against whose norms single events of judging might themselves be judged 
and validated), the collapse of the “grand narrative” (Callinicos 1994, 3, 9). The term 
“postmodern” itself has been described as usually pertaining to “poststructuralism” as it was 
poststructuralists who radicalized the critique of modern philosophy and became labelled as 
postmodern theorists (Cahoone 2003, 1). The metanarratives or grand narratives which were the 
supposedly transcendent and universal truths that underpinned Western civilization and that 
functioned to give that civilization objective legitimation have been thrown into doubt, 
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engendering what has been referred to as a “crisis of legitimation” (Bertens 1995, 124). The 
increasing popularity of the term “narrative” itself reflects the epistemological crisis of 
contemporary culture, “narrative” being what is left when belief in an absolute possibility of 
knowledge is eroded. It has become increasingly difficult to subscribe to the great and totalizing 
metanarratives that once organized our lives. 
 The accomplishment of the Scientific Revolution, the reliance upon a stable relationship 
between the subject and the object that was the cornerstone of Rene Descartes’s definition of 
knowledge, has come into crisis. The conceptualization of the truth as a coherent system of 
representation that corresponds to things as they are apart from consciousness, has been shaken. 
Truth is now just as likely to be the condition that I have achieved when my interpretation of 
reality makes sense to me, and is more of a coherence disguised as correspondence, i.e., 
representation. The notion of correspondence as an accurate representation of reality has been 
challenged as a generalized critique of the entire metaphysical enterprise. Truth claims have 
become particularized, denying the claim of any fixed and transcendental origin of knowledge. 
Knowledge is no longer thought of as an absolute permanent ontological reality passively 
received. Meaning and intellectual categories are now slippery, shifting and in flux. Meaning is 
unsettled, no longer reducible to structures of difference. Such structures of differential relations 
between terms require clear identifiable categories in order to be grasped by knowledge. While 
difference makes knowledge possible it is ungraspable using only the categories of knowledge; 
difference does not lend itself to identity. Under pressure is our ability to convey reality, which 
has relied on truth, including a correspondence between the subject and the object. The “real” 
can no longer be depended upon as the basis of a stable epistemology. 
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          Even the solidity of scientific knowledge has begun to experience scepticism in regard to 
its ability to grasp the object, causing science to give way to a form of narrative knowledge 
(Docherty 1993, 25). The frequently heard phrase “the narratives of science,” popular in the new 
field of science studies, carries the implication that scientific discourse does not reflect as 
covertly construct reality, does not discover truths but fabricates them in a process disturbingly 
comparable to the overt working of narrative fiction. Scientific knowledge itself, in its previous 
grounding in the totality of a governing theory, has come under suspicion, characterized by this 
incredulity toward metanarratives (Ibid., 25). Similarly, our authoritative epistemological grasp 
of nature as the real has been loosened. The generalized turn in theory has challenged the 
presumption that nature exits independent of culture to the point where nature, like the human 
subject, has become an artefact of language, a social construct, a fiction. The subject/object 
distinction, the idea of the human subject perceiving the natural world and coming to certain 
knowledge of it has similarly been put into question.  
 We are left with a problematic as to what can serve as a rational basis for choices that 
will ensure responsible behaviour in an atmosphere no longer able to rely on religious dogma or 
universal narrative truths, a time devoid of religious and philosophical certitude (Leiss 1974, 
196; McGowan 1991, 13). It has become increasingly difficult in a heterogeneous society, which 
tacitly embraces the notion of social relativity, to articulate an absolute conception of proper 
behaviour: there seems to be no external authority to which we can look for advice (Evernden 
1992, 6). In a world without the grounds or foundations for judgments, a world that is resolutely 
anti-foundationalist and anti-universalist – eschewing all appeals to ontological, epistemological 
or ethical absolutes – where does the basis for an ethical response lie (McGowan 1991, ix)? 
Where is the source of the compelling power of the ethical to be found (Casey 2003, 191)? The 
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importance of looking at this issue stems from the fact that we exist in an era where coming to 
terms with ethical judgments is without recourse to comforting principles that help to simplify 
difficult choices (Davis 1996, 53). Is it possible to have an ethics without foundations, without 
imperatives or any claim to universality or truth (Ibid., 3)?  
 
3.0.4 The Ethical Turn 
 It is with the crisis in epistemology brought about by the end of metaphysics and the loss 
of the moral agency of the subject understood as sovereign rational autonomy that 
poststructural/postmodern theory has been subject to accusations of nihilism, amorality, 
relativism, irrationalism and an incompatibility with ethical concerns. Perhaps as a response to 
these charges, French poststructural thought from the late 1970s in Europe (the mid-1980s in the 
United States) took a decidedly ethical turn. Its concern with/for the Other has been described as 
one of the hallmarks of poststructuralism (Davis 1996, 2, 124, 155; Critchley 2002, 2). A long 
series of books by some of the most prominent poststructural thinkers directly confronted ethical 
issues and, either implicitly or explicitly, it was Emmanuel Levinas’s account of alterity that 
became an almost obligatory point of reference, with ethics understood as the “questioning of the 
self as it encounters the irreducible Other” (Davis 1996, 125). 
 It is in the philosophical work of Emmanuel Levinas, in his analysis and concept of the 
ethical, born out of his experience of the Shoah, that represents the best example of an attempt to 
think through the ethical consequences of our time (Ibid., 53). Levinas’s relevance in a world 
without essences, foundations, or universality, is congruent with his refusal to totalize yet not to 
abandon the ethical. In fact, Levinas does not see the end of metaphysics as an irredeemable 
crisis, but as an “opportunity for Western philosophy to open itself to the dimension of otherness 
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and transcendence beyond being” (Cohen 1986, 33). Levinas abandons definitions of ethics as 
moral codes and principles based on rationality and universality, but not ethics, which, is 
understood by him as a relation of infinite responsibility to the Other. The significance of 
Levinas lies in his long-standing inquiry into ethical questions concerned with what it means to 
talk of justice or responsibility where our belief systems, either religious or scientifically 
rational, are in a state of collapse (Davis 1996, ix, 3). Levinas does not provide foundations or 
rules for morality, nor does he discuss virtue, or rights and duties (Ibid., 47). For Levinas, the 
ethical is the broader domain, where ethical experiences and relationships occur before the 
foundation of ethics in the sense of established principles, rules or codes (Ibid., 48).  To reduce 
the other, who calls me as a unique self in the face-to-face encounter, to a set of moral principles 
is a violence to the alterity of the Other. Ethics for Levinas is lived in the sensibility of an 
embodied exposure to the other (Critchley 2002, 21) Ethics, in the Levinasian sense, does not 
provide a path to knowledge of right and wrong, good or evil (Davis 1996, 143). The 
contemporary importance of Levinas’s ethics derives from the crucial role it accords to the 
problem of otherness, which ensures that his reflections have resonance in areas beyond his own 
circle of interest. 
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Section IV 
IN AND BEYOND DISCOURSE  
4.0     Levinas’s Ethics Of The Other 
Ethics in Anglo-American philosophy deals with the means of structuring the interactions 
of atomistic individuals. It is almost another technical fix, a cultural corrective to a 
congenital deformity (Evernden 1986, 69, 137). 
 
Levinas survived the Second World War as the other. He was a French prisoner of war in a 
German internment camp, thinking through an extreme ethics suited to the extreme 
circumstances in which it was thought through (Llewelyn 1991, 39; Parker 1989, 1). Levinas’s 
hope for ethics beyond knowledge and history, his insistence that our obligation to the other as 
non-reciprocal, and, in some sense, greater than the other’s obligation to us, emanates from what 
it meant in Nazi-dominated Europe to side with, shelter, or protect those condemned, to stand 
against the regime of evil, even if it meant torture and death for oneself, one’s family, friends and 
village (Gottlieb 1994, 233). To be responsible, as many were, was to reach out to those who 
could not reach back to you (Ibid.). This is the meaning of the non-reciprocal for Levinas. The 
Holocaust and his encounter with totalitarianism marked his work and is a response to the 
“traumas experienced by the subject” in our time, as mass industrialized murder cannot be 
dismissed as an aberration of the 1940s, but is the defining characteristic of the twentieth century 
(Gottlieb 1994, 135; Davis 1996, 84). Levinas has described his life as “dominated by the 
presentiment and the memory of the Nazi horror” and has dedicated Otherwise than Being, or 
Beyond Essence “To the memory of those who were … assassinated by the National Socialists, 
and to [all the other] victims of the same hatred of the other man, the same anti-semitism” 
(Levinas 1981, dedication page). The Shoah is not the only barbarism to have characterized the 
century. As Levinas states it is: 
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A century which in thirty years has known two world wars, totalitarianisms of the left and 
right. Hiroshima, the gulags, the genocides of Auschwitz and Cambodia. A century which 
is drawing to an end with the sceptre of the return of all that these barbaric names evoke. 
Suffering and evil imposed deliberately, but which no reason could limit in the 
exasperation of reason which has become political and detached from all ethics (cited in 
Davis 1996, 143). 
 
4.0.1 The Phenomenology of Husserl 
 It was Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) who saw the crisis of European man as “the seeming 
collapse of rationalism,” setting himself the objective of “saving human reason” (Stumpf 1979, 
375). His development of the phenomenological method launched with Logical Investigations 
(1900-01) was a move away from a naturalistic conception of the world (subject/object) as a way 
of knowing, and in its stead Husserl proposed that rationality include value and meaning 
reflective of the world as we experience it. For Husserl, the goal was to understand how we 
ordinarily pre-theoretically experience by describing its historical emergence from an origin or 
event. The phenomenological method discloses the structure of conscious experience, the way 
phenomena appear in consciousness by means of intention and reduction, or epoche (from the 
Greek abstaining from belief). The reduction to epoche as a refusal of judgement, a “bracketing” 
that declines assumptions about the natural world is a process where intentionality “constitutes” 
the objects of cognition. Phenomenology has been described as, “the broadest, deepest, most 
flexible conception of science ever to be conceived” (Cohen 2001, 12). It expresses a notion that 
challenges us to see how a shift in emphasis from “symbolic” or “objectifying” functions and the 
usual array of conditioned responses (perceiving, observing), to experiencing the world can 
provide us with a way of accessing the world that might alter our expectations and behaviour 
towards the world at large (Evernden 1986, 43; Livingston 1983, 66). 
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 In spite of the fact that Husserl, a defender of science, set out to provide a secure 
foundation to scientific knowledge, his major achievement for Levinas lies in the liberation of 
philosophy from the “stranglehold of naturalist epistemology” (Davis 1996, 11). This liberation 
is achieved by Husserl’s rethinking of the phenomenon whereby phenomenology provides a 
method for investigating the experience of the world freed from the scientific search for 
objective essences hidden behind phenomenal existence (Ibid., 11, 12). Scientific objectivity 
accepts an unquestioned ontology in its quest for secure knowledge; it relies on a pursuit of a 
stable essence hidden behind the flux of perceived phenomena (Ibid., 11). Husserl erases this 
implicit separation of essence and phenomenon (Ibid., 11-12). Unlike theories of knowledge 
such as that of Descartes, which distinguish between a knowing mind, on the one hand, the 
object of knowledge on the other, Husserl rejects the dualism seeing virtually no distinction 
between consciousness and the phenomena. His unique point is that phenomena – whatever is – 
are ultimately contained in the very subjective act whereby what is, is present to consciousness. 
For Husserl it is consciousness of an object and not the essences of objects that defines Being. 
This attitude is contrary to naturalism, which assumes an objective physical world independently 
existing (Ibid.). Phenomenology is not the study of phenomena as distinct from these essences; in 
phenomenology, phenomena are the available mode of presentation of essences (Ibid., 12). 
Phenomenology thus surpasses naturalist epistemology in its establishment of two new areas of 
investigation: studying existence in all its multiplicity, not simply as unchanging essences, but as 
well, exploring the meaning of the existence of objects, not in a theological sense, but in a 
secular way, as meaning is conferred on the world by the intentional acts/processes of 
consciousness (noesis), and also as the intentional objects give meaning to those acts and are 
constituted by consciousness (noema) (Davis 1996, 12; Critchley 1999, 4). For Levinas, Husserl 
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surpasses naturalist epistemology by rethinking the fundamental distinction inaugurated by 
Descartes between subject and object (Davis 1996, 12). 
 Husserlian phenomenology occupies a central place in the development of philosophy, 
retaining a privileged position in the writings of Levinas with his development of the 
phenomenological approach. But it is Levinas’s dissatisfaction with phenomenology that marks 
the most important phase of his philosophical career developing into a critical rereading of the 
history of Western philosophy and civilization in general, as a failure to think of the Other as 
Other, seeking to appropriate and assimilate the Other, to neutralize the threat it poses to the 
autonomy and sovereignty of the same (Ibid., 8, 32, 33, 142). 
 
4.0.2 Beyond Husserl and Heidegger 
 Similarly, while the work of Heidegger appeared to Levinas as a crucial but dangerous 
stage in modern philosophy; it is in order to escape the limitations of Heidegger’s thought that 
Levinas entails thinking through and beyond him, rather than returning to the comforts of “pre-
Heideggerian naivety” (Davis 1996, 9; Critchley 2002, 10). Levinas had difficulty separating 
Heidegger’s later philosophy from his involvement with National Socialism, his membership in 
the Nazi party, and his acceptance of the position of Rector of Freiburg University in 1933, 
where he delivered his inaugural address endorsing the Nazi program (Critchley 2002, 8; 
Zimmerman 1994, 114). If Levinas’s life was dominated by the Nazi horror, his philosophical 
life was animated by the question of how someone as brilliant as Heidegger could have become a 
Nazi (Critchley 2002, 8)? Levinas could not forgive Heidegger’s lack of public expressions of 
regret for that support and for the victims of Nazism (Zimmerman 1994, 114). Levinas 
consequently developed a post-phenomenological ethics in opposition to the phenomenology not 
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only of Husserl but also of Heidegger, leading to his work being described as “postmodern, post-
phenomenological and post-Heideggerian” (Davis 1996, 8). He has been referred to as 
“genuinely” postmodern because he challenges the hegemony of epistemology (Cohen 2001, 5). 
Levinas insisted that phenomenology is a method, which one must pass through toward any 
thinking beyond what has been described as the ethical impasse of phenomenology (Davis 1996, 
33).  
 Levinas considered the principle and abiding contribution of the phenomenological 
method to be its heightened reflexivity towards its own status, “a radical, obstinate reflection 
about itself” (cited in Davis 1996, 9). At the same time he criticized Husserl’s intellectualism, in 
which consciousness is the starting point of meaning; contemplatively standing outside time and 
the historical experiences it observes (Cohen 2001, 8; Davis 1996, 13). Levinas was also critical 
of Husserl’s lack of intersubjectivity, whereby the epoche, which reveals the transcendental Ego, 
is outside the world, unable on its own to demonstrate the existence of other minds (Davis 1996, 
13). These criticisms derive from the fact that Levinas is reading Husserl “through the powerful 
lens of Heidegger’s Being and Time” (Ibid.). Levinas sees Heidegger crucially modifying the 
phenomenological project by stressing the ontological dimension of phenomenology, already 
found in Husserl’s work, giving it an ontological turn as he accords it a privileged role in his 
project to describe Being (Ibid., 14). For Levinas, the importance of Heidegger’s 
phenomenological ontology lies in dislodging the absolute primacy accorded by Husserl to 
consciousness: Heidegger “knocks consciousness off its pedestal” (Ibid., 15, 16). Heidegger’s 
project does not assume a merely intellectual attitude, but a rich variety of intentional life – 
emotional, practical and theoretical – through which we relate to others (Peperzak, Critchley, 
Bernasconi 1996, 1; Critchley 2002, 9). Heidegger’s Dasein literally means “there being” and 
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highlights the central Heideggerian notion that human existence is always in-the-world (Levinas 
1997a, 40). 13 For Levinas the ethical subject is an embodied being of flesh and blood, a being 
capable of hunger as well as enjoying the food eaten (Levinas 1981, 74; Critchley 2002, 22). 
Levinas complains that Heidegger’s Dasein is never hungry, nor are all the various heirs to the 
res cogitants. As Levinas stated, “The need for food does not have existence as its goal, but 
food” (Levinas 1969, 134). Levinas maintains that only a being that can know what it means to 
give its bread from out of its own mouth can be for the other (Levinas 1969, 134; Levinas 1981, 
74, 142). “It is not a gift of the heart, but of the bread from one’s mouth, of one’s own mouthful 
of bread” (Levinas 1981, 74). Levinasian ethics is rooted in the face-to-face bonds of everyday 
sociality, implying a worldly rather than a spiritual transcendental realm (Gardiner 1996, 132). 
To give the bread from one’s own mouth implies a body. Levinas is therefore able to crucially 
modify the understanding of intentionality in phenomenology where an entity counts only on the 
basis of appearing and knowing (Levinas 1981, 80). In moving beyond Husserl, Levinas 
emphasizes that, in the ethical relation to alterity, intentionality is forced to encounter the world 
as enigmatic, and opaque, never completely known; consciousness is thus interrupted in its self-
contented possession of itself and what lies outside (Davis 1996, 21). It is no longer 
consciousness of “something” as it is for Husserl, but “an exit from oneself” with alterity, as it is 
for Levinas.  
For Levinas, Heidegger’s thought becomes not only a means of moving beyond Husserl, 
but Heidegger is a figure to be moved beyond as well. In Levinas’s interpretation of Heidegger, 
the fundamental encounter for humans is not with other beings, but with Being itself (Ibid., 23). 
                                                         
13 Heidegger also sought to overcome the primacy that had been attached to epistemology as a theory of knowledge 
(Bernasconi 2006, 22). When Immanuel Kant said that it was scandalous that there was no proof for the existence of 
the external world, Heidegger’s response was that the world was not external and that the real scandal was that such 
a proof was sought (Ibid., 22-23).    
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For Levinas, Heidegger’s theoretical shortcoming is thus identical to Husserl’s, in that he 
subsumes the Other under the authority of the same, an object of the self (Ibid., 21). Levinas 
consequently described Heidegger’s work as “a tragic testimony to an age and a world which 
may need to be surpassed,” suggesting that Heidegger’s ontology is in some ways “strictly 
classical” (Ibid.,16, 17). In intellectual terms, Levinas’s desire to escape the climate of 
Heidegger’s thought entails the rejection of a philosophical style and the world-view inherent in 
it, a move towards alterity rather than a realization of totality, a liberation from unity and 
sameness rather than a yearning for complete comprehension (Cohen 1997, vii, 2; Davis 1996, 
18).  
 For Levinas, the Heideggerian ontological relationship, even though it exceeds 
intellectualism, nonetheless reduces alterity to the same, because the particular is always 
understood with reference to the universal, and because the Other is always encountered in the 
intimacy of Being, maintaining the priority of Being over otherness in Mitsein (together being, as 
the absorption of the Other) rather than from outside, a position from which the Other would 
challenge the sovereignty of my comprehension of the world (Davis 1996, 30, 48, 65; Peperzak, 
Critchley, Bernasconi 1996, 1). Levinas’s one simple but far-reaching idea is that Western 
philosophy and civilization has consistently practiced a suppression of the Other, a primacy of 
the self/same over the Other which takes place because speculative thought can only conceive of 
the other within the I’s epistemological horizon: it always reduces alterity to the measure of the 
same (Davis 1996, ix; Docherty 1993, 26). Levinas questions whether the relation of man to 
Being is uniquely ontological, whether ontology exhausts the possibilities of a relationship with 
Being or, whether there is something which exceeds ontology, which may be even more 
fundamental (Davis 1996, 16, 17; Peperzak, Critchley, Bernasconi 1996, 1)? He asks, “How … 
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can the relation with being be, from the outset, anything other than its comprehension as being?” 
(Levinas 1996a, 6) His response is that it cannot, “Unless it is the Other” (Ibid.). “Our relation 
with the other certainly consists in wanting to comprehend him, but this relation overflows 
comprehension” (Ibid.). Heidegger’s question of Being is not the question of the Other, yet for 
Levinas it is the event of being in relation with the other that Levinas calls ethical, which 
replaces Heidegger’s establishment of ontology as the proper domain of phenomenology 
(Peperzak, Critchley, Bernasconi 1996, 2). The ethical face-to-face encounter of the self and 
Other cuts across ontology radically and irreducibly: it is otherwise, or beyond being (Levinas 
1982, 9). The face of the other deposes Being, a move from Being to Being’s other, or Otherwise 
than Being. For Levinas, “to be” is not enough; “to be or not to be” is not the question (Levinas 
1981, 3). In his view, ethics occurs prior to essence and being and conditions them; the ethical 
event occurs prior to how we construct it (Cohen 1985, 9).  
  
4.0.3 Encountering the Other 
While knowledge knows, it cannot rank importance. In defending ethics ethically, 
insisting on an excellence rather than yet another truth or untruth, Levinas surpasses the 
entire enterprise of philosophy hitherto conceived (Cohen 2001, 5-6). 
 
Levinas conceives the Infinite or God (transcendence, infinity) as the Other human. Through the 
ethical encounter with the face of the Other human the idea of the Infinite, God or transcendence 
can be encountered. In other words, the trace of God is in the face of the Other. For Levinas, the 
relationship with the other is irreducible to comprehension, knowledge or thematization, 
precisely because it is a relationship with the Other, with the unknowable absolute other (the 
transcendent) not dependent on a relation with me. Mere externality would lead to domination 
and assimilation or same making (Levinas 1996a, 5). Levinas takes the idea of the “Infinite” 
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from Descartes as a thought that thinks “more than it can think,” a thought that cannot contain 
the Infinite (Levinas 1969, 49; Levinas 1981, 146). For Levinas, this marks an instance in 
Western philosophy where the trace of the ethical breaks through the ontological in the inability 
of cognition to reduce the other to the same as a relationship with transcendence, the Other 
overflowing the thought that thinks it. To preserve the Other as Other, it must not become an 
object of knowledge or experience, because knowledge and experience are always my knowledge 
and experience; encountering the other in these ways diminishes its alterity (Davis 1996, 41). 
Recognition, knowledge, representation, adequation, understanding or empathizing never 
encounters anything truly other in the world as intelligibility makes everything come from me 
(Levinas, 1997, 68). It is Levinas’s contention that Western civilization shows a horrific 
propensity to reduce everything that is fortuitous, foreign and enigmatic to conditions of 
transparent intelligibility, recoiling from anything that cannot be rationally ordered and 
manipulated (Hutchens 2004, 14). This has led to an overemphasis on unity and totality and an 
engagement in a pursuit of objective and certain knowledge of this totality (Gardiner 1996, 129). 
For Levinas, the problem of the Other has been misposed historically, rather than seeking even 
more knowledge of it (thus reducing its otherness) we should accept that we do not, cannot, and 
should not know the Other (Davis 1996, 33). For Levinas the other is primarily that which defies 
knowledge, and every attempt to thematize and thus capture and grasp that alterity as a concept. 
The Levinasian “pre-original relationship” is precognitive; it cannot have the same structure as 
knowledge, as it is not a reflection upon the other, but an active engagement in a 
noncomprehensive, nonsubsumptive relation to alterity, a focus on the singular individual in 
front of me, foregoing the mediation of the universal (Levinas 1982, 60; Critchley 2002, 12; 
Peperzak, Critchley, Bernasconi 1996, 2). The pre-original relationship is not “more originary 
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than the origin” but it refers to an “irrecuperable pre-ontological past” that “cannot be 
subordinated to the vicissitudes of representation and knowledge…or an exchange of 
information” (Levinas 1981, 78-79). For Levinas, the other does not belong to the sphere of 
intelligibility, but stands in proximity (Ibid., 25). Proximity, unlike cognition, can better 
approach an entirely other, as alterity is imposed quite differently than the reality of the real 
(Levinas 1981, 18; Horowitz 2000, 304). 
  
4.0.4     Subjectivity 
 
It is an assignation to answer without evasions, which assigns the self to be a self 
(Levinas 1981, 106). 
 
The word “I” means to be answerable for everything and for everyone … The self bears 
the weight of the world; it is responsible for everyone (Levinas 1996d, 90). 
 
 
Levinas acknowledges that Western philosophical thought has been dominated by the reduction 
of subjectivity to consciousness, a critique rendered against the Enlightenment model of 
autonomy (egocentric subjectivity) that is reductive of the other (Levinas 1981, 103).14 Ethics 
(understood as responsibility) redefines subjectivity from autonomous freedom (self-preservation 
preserved when subjects are free, equal and relate reciprocally) to a responsibility for the other 
(when I substitute myself for the other). For Levinas, the ego in consciousness reflecting on itself 
“escapes its own critical eye” and thus is always limited (Ibid., 92, 102). Similarly, the voyage of 
Odysseus for Levinas represents the fact that Western philosophy while it may leave the self, 
always returns home, back to itself (a reduction of the other to the same/self). For Levinas, 
consciousness, knowing oneself by oneself, is not all there is to the notion of subjectivity. 
Consciousness does not exhaust the notion of subjectivity even though they have long been 
                                                         
14For Levinas, autonomy as freedom is preceded by the primordial call of the other. 
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treated as equivalent concepts (Levinas 1981, 102; Levinas 1996d, 82-82). “The oneself has not 
issued from its own initiative” as it is responsibility, a relationship with the other, with alterity 
itself that is constitutive of subjectivity (Levinas 1981, 105; Lingis 1978, xiii). Responsibility to 
the Other constitutes a true subject as “It is as responsible that one is incarnated” (Levinas 1981, 
105). Subjectivity is responsibility for-the-other, not a feature or an attribute of subjectivity. 
Levinas provides a description of the context in which the stakes of ethics are established, a 
context crucially defined not only by the presence of the Other but by “finding oneself 
addressed” and “appealed to” (Ibid., xxii). His departure resides in the claim that ethics begins 
not with the claim of myself as an autonomous being, but with a sense of myself and an 
obligation as in relation to an Other, a being who is not myself (the “same”) and who sets limits, 
and puts into critical question my capacity for free action (Matthews 1996, 160). In the words of 
Levinas, 
A calling into question of the Same – which cannot occur within the egoistic spontaneity 
of the Same – is brought about by the Other. We name this calling into question of my 
spontaneity by the presence of the Other ethics. The strangeness of the Other, his 
irreducibility to the I, to my thoughts and my possessions, is precisely accomplished as a 
calling into question of my spontaneity, as ethics (Levinas 1969, 33, 43). 
 
For Levinas, subjectivity is “the restlessness of the same disturbed by the other” or, it can be 
seen as alterity escaping the cognitive powers of the knowing subject (Critchley 2002, 5; Levinas 
1981, 25). The ethical is therefore a location of alterity or “exteriority” that defies and cannot be 
reduced to the same.  
 The event of the subject’s exposure to the Other does not occur as an event within the 
experience of the subject; it is an interruption, a breaking out. It is the pre-original event of 
subjectivity, the founding condition of subjectivity, not an aspect of it (Davis 1996, 79-80). The 
very nature of its existence is in proximity to the Other, approaching the Other in the “risky 
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uncovering of oneself, in sincerity, breaking up of inwardness and the abandon of all shelter, 
exposure to traumas, vulnerability” (Levinas 1981, 48). The subject is possible only with its 
recognition and response to the Other, a recognition that carries responsibility, a response toward 
not what is different (difference manifests itself in the ontological realm), but what is irreducibly 
other (as independent from me). It is not that responsibility cannot be declined; whether I choose 
to respond does not alter the fact that I am called to respond. I am free to decline; to decline is 
still to respond, the appeal cannot be ignored as I have no choice in the matter. The 
“impossibility of declining responsibility is reflected only in the scruple or remorse which 
precedes or follows this refusal” (Ibid., 6-7). It is in the encounter with the alterity of the Other 
that I am radically challenged throwing my identity and relation with the world into question 
(Ibid., 143). It is in my response to the encounter wherein is defined my own ethical nature 
(Ibid.). The results of hermeneutic and ethical encounters are not then predetermined, but are 
produced in the encounter itself (Ibid.). For Levinas, it is impossible not to hear the other’s call. 
The subject arises in response to the other’s call, it is my experience of a demand that I cannot 
fully meet and cannot avoid. 
  
4.0.5 Proximity  
Without the proximity of the other in his face everything is absorbed, sunken into, walled 
in being, goes to the same side, forms a whole, absorbing the very subject to which it is 
disclosed. Essence, the being of entities, weaves between the incomparables, between me 
and the others a unity, a community … and drags us off and assembles us on the same 
side, chaining us to one another like galley slaves, emptying proximity of its meaning 
(Levinas 1981, 182). 
  
In pre-ontological proximity as exteriority, a subject is implicated “anarchically” in a way not 
reducible to principles or a spatial sense since, as a principle, proximity would be representation 
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(Ibid., 81-82, 100).15 Proximity here cannot be resolved into “images” or be exposed in a theme 
(Ibid., 100). The shift that Levinas speaks about is the recognition that the relation with another 
is not only a knowing or a participation in a common universality, but a prior proximity – the 
face-to-face contact and my responsibility for the other, as well as a peace incumbent on me in 
proximity (Horowitz 2000, 301; Levinas 1981, 166-167). Proximity here is described by Levinas 
“as quite distinct from every other relationship, and it has to be conceived as a responsibility for 
the other; it might be called humanity, or subjectivity, or self” (Levinas 1981, 46). As humanity, 
proximity similarly cannot be first understood as consciousness (as the identity of an ego 
endowed with knowledge, where everything is intentionally assumed) since consciousness is 
where singularity is lost in its universality (Ibid., 83, 102).  Proximity is a disturbance (Ibid., 89).  
 For Levinas, the will is not autonomous; the subject is not self-determining. The subject 
is not good voluntarily; goodness chooses the subject that is “chosen without assuming the 
choice!” before “I have chosen it” “goodness despite itself” keeping “no accounts” (Ibid., 11, 18, 
31, 52, 56). “The Good cannot become present or enter into a representation,” as “To reduce the 
good to being, to its calculations and history, is to nullify goodness” (Ibid., 11, 18). Goodness is 
not an attribute that can be taken up as to know oneself to be good is to loose goodness (Ibid., 
57). “This non-initiative is older than any present, and is not a passivity contemporaneous with 
and counterpart of any act. It is on the hither side of the free and the non-free, the anarchy of the 
Good” (Ibid., 74). 
                                                         
15 Anarchy for Levinas is not disorder as opposed to order, as disorder is just another order. 
Anarchy “troubles being over and beyond what is thematizable” since taken literally it is not 
grounded in a principle but is prior to all principles, “more ancient than the beginning”  (Levinas 
1981, 101, 165; Levinas 1968, 81). Anarchy is a relation with proximity and substitution and, as 
such, occurs prior to one’s ontological relation to oneself or to the totality. In the concrete it is 
the relationship with the neighbour (Levinas 1968, 81). 
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 For Levinas, subjectivity includes not only responsibility for the other, but also 
substitution for the other as a hostage. To become a hostage, and substitute the self for the other, 
increases responsibility and frees the self from imprisonment to itself. I am held hostage in the 
relationship, responding before I have the will to respond (Horowitz 2000, 303). I am already a 
hostage. I am held hostage because my responsibility for the other does not arise from my free 
choice but is located in the unavoidability of the Other’s call. Responsibility as obsession and as 
hostage is not a will to generosity or to sacrifice, as I am at my most radically passive; 
responsibility takes place despite myself (Ibid.). Ethical force cannot be reduced to cognitive 
cogency, to acts of consciousness or will (Cohen 1986, 5). The relationship with the other, with 
alterity, consists in being contested and appealed to by the other, a movement that comes from 
without as alterity, not posited by any act of my subjectivity (Lingis 1978, xvii). When Levinas 
writes of passivity, he does not have in mind a neutral equilibrium of activity and passivity, but 
rather an ethical imbalance, in which I am subject to the Other’s summons, suffering a 
responsibility such that to assume it and make it internal to my own project, would be to fail in 
my responsibility (Llewelyn 1991, 84). I undergo the approach, the coming-on-the-scene of the 
other passively, disinterestedness reflects not being caught up in the order of Being, not able to 
make it into my own principle; this is the sense of what “being contested consists” (Lingis 1978, 
xvii). Passivity cannot be reduced to an experience that a subject would have of it (Levinas 1981, 
54). This taking up of my responsibilities is not an exercise of power, not even the power of a 
good will, as it is outside any system of terms in reciprocal relation, outside of any systematicity 
(Llewelyn 1991, 39, 54). As a hostage, the self is prior to principles, older than the ego, beyond 
the intentionality of egoism, altruism, “natural benevolence” or love (Levinas 1981, 111, 117). It 
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is as hostage “that there can be in the world pity, compassion, pardon and proximity – even the 
little there is, even the simple “After you, sir,” indicative of a response”” (Ibid.).  
 
4.0.6 Singularity 
 Levinas begins with a postmodern dimension of a singular subjectivity (Lash 1996, 103). 
Singularity in the pre-ontological for Levinas means: no one else can take my place, as I am 
unique; uniqueness in responsibility means the impossibility of “slipping away” (Levinas 1981, 
56). In the words of Levinas, “ I am then called upon in my uniqueness as someone for whom no 
one else can substitute himself” (Ibid., 59). In the words of Bauman, “we is not the plural of I” 
(Bauman 2004, 48). God calls Levinas’s subject by name; the command to slay his son is 
Abraham’s alone (Lash 1996, 92). No one else can respond as a substitute, as responsibility 
cannot be passed on to someone else (Levinas 1985, 101; Gardiner 1996, 132; Hutchens 2004, 
23). The address is not to an abstract I, nor to a prescriptive moral code, nor to one’s capacity to 
fulfilling one’s role in an institutional framework, but the address in Levinas’s Totality and 
Infinity (1961) is to a single individual (Gardiner 1996, 92; Levinas 1985, 101). This I as unique 
singularity, as subjectivity, is unconditionally and non-reciprocally responsible for the other, as 
well as for the other’s responsibilities, as I am always more responsible than anyone else 
(Levinas 1985, 99). In opposition to Descartes’s motto of modern philosophy and personhood, 
Levinas offers the Hebrew phrase Hineni, “Here I am” (Parker 1989, 1). According to Levinas, 
“Here I am” is the full and responsible response to the call of another before, and despite, itself 
(Ibid.). The I is commanded and made responsible by the Other, denoted in the biblical 
command, in a concern with “the widow, the stranger, the orphan” (Cohen 1997, 16, 17; 
Llewelyn 1991, 47; Parker 1989, 1). The command calls from the Other, I am ordered, I am 
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obligated (Wall 1999, 37). It is an obedience that precedes hearing the law’s command, “Here I 
am,” as the essential “openness” to the Other is an act of exposure and vulnerability (Gardiner 
1996, 132; Llewelyn 1991, 274). “To say: here I am me voici ... that’s it” (Levinas 1985, 97). 
Levinas’s wish is that out of the sheer fact of otherness there is hope for ethical life, as there is 
nothing else that can protect the “the weak, the poor, the vulnerable,” since in a different setting 
another group will constitute the otherness that is “grist for the mill of power and murder” 
(Gottlieb 1994, 239).  
 
4.0.7 Not Guilty, But Accused 
In an approach I am first a servant of a neighbor already late and guilty for being late 
(Levinas 1981, 87). 
 
Levinas argues that subjectivity or self- consciousness is the feeling of being “not guilty, but 
accused,” accused of what one never willed or chose, a guilt without origins or appeasement. In 
his words: “Responsibility for the other does not wait for the freedom of commitment to the 
other as commitment. Without ever having done anything, I have always been under accusation” 
(Levinas 1996d, 89; Levinas 1981, 114).16 To be a self is to be responsible beyond what one has 
done oneself, always having done less than one could have. It is about responsibility for every 
persecution toward those who we do not even know (Levinas 1996d, 81). This is not a 
representation of the other to which we then respond. “It is already a summons of extreme 
exigency; an obligation which is anachronistically prior to every engagement” (Ibid.). For 
Levinas, all those who lived through the years 1939 to 1945 “retained a burn on their sides ... as 
though they had to bear forever the shame of having survived” (Myers 1999, 272). In affirming 
                                                         
16 Commitment already presupposes a theoretical consciousness, … a taking up that goes beyond 
the susceptiveness of passivity … Commitment refers … to an intentional thought, an 
assumption, a subject open upon a present, representation (Levinas 1981, 137).  
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“one’s right to be,” self-consciousness, even though it came to exist without intentionality and 
without any obvious transgression, is not an inoffensive action in which the self takes note of its 
being. The very presence of the self is an awareness of its existence and similarly an awareness 
of the “gnawing of conscience” (Ibid., 273). Is it possible that our “coming into being [is] the 
result of a crime of which [we] are unaware?” (Ibid.) In other words, while I may not be taking 
another’s life, I am doing nothing to keep someone alive, since I may be consuming something 
that could save the life of someone starving in the world (Llewelyn 1991, 40). Levinas states, 
My being-in-the-world or my “place in the sun,” my being at home, have these not also 
been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have already oppressed 
or starved, or driven out into a third world; are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, 
exiling, stripping, killing? Pascal’s my “place in the sun” marks the beginning of the 
image of the usurpation of the whole earth (cited in Myers 1999, 273). 
 
How then to respond to this uneasy sense of being “not guilty, but accused?” If I am not guilty of 
hurting another I cannot be blamed for it, but if I nevertheless feel accused of it, I can take 
responsibility for it, easing my conscience, and begin to repair any damage that I might have 
done (Myers 1999, 273). My responsibility to the Other, because the injury is not specified and 
therefore not limited to my relation to the Other, is a relation of infinite responsibility, which 
means there is no escaping it (Levinas 1996b, 20). Subjectivity is consequently ethical from its 
very first eventful moment, as it is pre-reflective, as one is always already responsible to and for 
others (Levinas 1996b, 21; Davis 1996, 80; Gardiner 1996, 133). The Other’s command calls 
forth a subjectivity for-the-other, that is to say, a subjectivity which “fears murder more than 
death” (Cohen 1997, 17). Responsibility here always weighs on the subject, not in an empathetic 
sense but, instead, as a response to radical alterity. The proximity of the face-to-face “allows us 
to understand goodness in another way than as an altruistic inclination to be satisfied” (emphasis 
added) (Levinas 1981, 138). 
56 
4.0.8 Responsibility 
 Levinas’s concept of responsibility is a one-way movement containing no reciprocity; it 
is an exercise that is completely gratuitous (Ibid., 84). The ethical encounter with the Other is 
asymmetrical and unequal as “the knot of subjectivity consists in going to the other without 
concerning oneself with his movement toward me” (Davis 1996, 35; Levinas 1981, 84). The 
other and I are not in correlation, not connected dialectically, a necessity if we were to be in a 
relation of power; responsibility is a relation that exceeds power (Llewelyn 1991, 28; Wall 1999, 
33). Levinas’s decoupling of responsibility from reciprocity has been described as the decisive 
act that distinguishes his ethical theory from virtually all others (Bauman 2004, 220; Davis 1996, 
51). For Levinas, 
[the] intersubjective relation is a non-symmetrical relation. In this sense I am responsible 
for the other, without waiting for reciprocity, were I to die for it. Reciprocity is his affair. 
It is precisely insofar as the relation between the Other and me is not reciprocal that I am 
subjection to the Other; and I am “subject” essentially in this sense. It is I who support 
all. The I always has one responsibility more than all the others (Levinas 1985, 98, 99). 
 
This inequality, this not-asking-for-reciprocation, this disinterest in mutuality, this indifference 
to the “balancing up” of gains or rewards, this “unbalanced” and hence non-reversible character 
of the I/Other relationship is what makes the encounter a moral event (Bauman 2004, 48-49).  In 
this way Levinas binds the existence of the subject, the I, to a situation in which there is no 
slipping away from responsibility to the other. Responsibility empties the I of its imperialism and 
its egoism. 
 
4.0.9 Desire Beyond Need 
  Levinas does not ignore our need to take from nature. Rather he acknowledges our need 
to survive and, in describing this need notes that, prior to secularization, being was thought to 
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have been given existence by divine decree. This idea changed radically as a result of 
contemporary philosophy and the Scientific Revolution and was re-constituted as the “struggle 
for life” (Diehm 2003, 182). Living beings therefore “strive” to exist in the tension between 
being and nonbeing, engaging in the struggle that beings, whose existence has no divine 
guarantee, must endure to maintain their tenuous hold on life (Ibid.). Levinas acknowledges the 
concept of “need” as a motive of self-concern, a struggle for life without ethics, a relation with 
oneself, with nothing which is other (Diehm 2000, 51). Levinas is not critical of need. Unaware 
of the challenge of the Other, the self finds itself in an alien environment, surrounded by objects 
which comply with or oppose its needs, but it is not in exile; on the contrary, it feels entirely at 
home in the world. The strangeness of the world is its charm, a cause of happiness (Davis 1996, 
43). Levinas describes this order of things as an existence, which is essentially appropriative and 
recuperative of oneself (Diehm 2000, 51). Need leads to seeking, finding, grasping, assimilating, 
same-making, totalizing (Ajzenstat 2001, 65). Levinas depicts need as a material dependence 
which the self fulfils and satisfies but he makes a distinction between need and Desire (Davis 
1996, 43). Levinas states that Desire rather than need commands acts (Levinas 1969, 299). Need 
for the other can be fulfilled but it is our insatiable Desire without end, an attraction by 
something not needed, by the otherness of the other, the strangeness, transcendence, alterity, the 
exteriority of the Other that cannot and is never satisfied (Ibid., 34). Satisfaction is impossible 
because the closer one gets the more evident the alterity of the other becomes. The meaning of 
Desire for Levinas is transcendence, exteriority, Otherness, concretized in ethics as a Desire 
divorced from my needs precisely because it is centred on the concrete needs of the Other, 
occurring across materiality in giving. 
 
58 
4.0.10  The Unreasonable 
 It is in ethics that something new happens, something unprecedented in the life of a being 
concerned with its survival (Diehm 2000, 51). Ethics is something radically un-economical 
(Ibid., 51). It is a break with a being-for-itself, whereby the life of the other is more important 
than my life, a “mode of proximity to the other and to alterity … a surplus of sociality and love 
where love is conceived first of all as “fear for the other”” (Horowitz 2000, 295).17 The ethical 
relation is not only primordially prior to, the reason of the said, it is in fact unreasonably illogical 
(Ibid., 302, 304, 305). Reason cannot help the moral self without depriving the self of what 
makes the self moral: “that unfounded, non-rational, unarguable, no excuses given and non-
calculable urge to stretch towards the other, to caress, to be for, to live for, happen what may” 
(Bauman 2004, 247). Reason is about making correct decisions, while ethical responsibility 
precedes all thinking about decisions, as it does not and cannot care about any logic that would 
allow the approval of an action as correct (Ibid., 247-248). In other words, as Levinas says, “man 
is an unreasonable animal” and it is not reason that can liberate man, but the capacity to break 
with reason by putting the needs of the Other first. Levinas is arguing for a definition of 
rationality that brings out that the height of rationality is what, by the standards of rationality as 
traditionally understood, would be deemed the height of folly (Llewelyn 1991, 67). Levinas calls 
this “folly at the confines of reason” (Levinas 1981, 50). As Bauman says, “At the far end of the 
long march of reason, moral nihilism waits” (Bauman 2004, 248). Ethics cannot be derived from 
reason as ethics is not a form of knowledge.  
 
 
                                                         
17 In neither Kant nor in Heidegger is the mortality of the other given priority over my own as in 
Levinas (Llewelyn 1991, 80). 
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4.0.11  The Saying and the Said 
 It was Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) who provided the first extended discussion (both an 
admiration and a Derridean deconstructive reading) of Levinas’s work in “Violence and 
Metaphysics” published in two parts in 1964 and then reprinted with significant modifications in 
1967 in Writing and Difference (1978) (Critchley 2002, 2). Derrida highlighted in “Violence and 
Metaphysics” that the exteriority Levinas strived to achieve was necessarily located in the 
language of ontology, lodged within traditional conceptuality. The contradiction is maintained, 
what intends to escape ontology, remains, as Derrida suggested, expressed in ontological terms, 
since the attempt to find an ethical opening beyond ontological language is in language. Levinas 
expresses this when he states that, “the correlation of the saying and the said, that is, the 
subordination of the saying to the said, to the linguistic system and to ontology, is the price that 
manifestation demands” (Levinas 1981, 6). Levinas confessed that he was “tormented” by 
Derrida’s probing questions, and as a consequence, in his second major philosophical book, 
Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence (1974) Levinas attempted to get away from ontological 
language by distinguishing between the saying and the said. Simply put, the saying is ethical, and 
the said is ontological, and Levinas uses the distinction to explain how the ethical signifies 
within ontological language how “Language permits us to utter, be it by betrayal, this outside of 
being” (Levinas, 1981, 6). “The responsibility for another is precisely as saying prior to anything 
said” (Ibid., 43). 
 “Saying runs the risk of being absorbed as soon as the said is formulated” yet, “what is 
absorbed is not exhausted in the manifestation” as the saying imprints its trace on thematization 
(Ibid., 47). Thus, even though the saying is betrayed in the said, the said retains a trace of the 
ethical saying. As John Llewelyn states, there is a remainder of the saying, once it has been said, 
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that he compares to the smile left behind after the subtraction of the face of the Cheshire cat in 
Lewiss Carroll’s Alice in Wonderland (Llewelyn 1991, 63). For every unsaying there 
immediately accrues another said, calling to be unsaid again to infinity (Ibid.). This opposition 
does not mean that the saying can dispense with the said, in fact “the said dominates the saying 
which states it” yet, as soon as the otherwise than being is conveyed, the unavoidable betrayal 
takes place in the said (Levinas 1981, 7). In the words of Levinas, “It is by the approach, the one-
for-the-other of saying, related by the said, that the said remains an insurmountable equivocation, 
where meaning refuses simultaneity, does not enter into being, does not compose a whole” (Ibid., 
170). Levinas admits that there must be comparison, thematization, thought and history, yet 
everything rests on an ethical relation that is prior: the saying that precedes the said. The 
difference between Totality and Infinity (1961) and Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 
(1974) is that the former is an articulation of the non-ontological experience of the face of the 
other in the language of ontology, while the latter is a performative enactment of an ethical 
writing which endlessly runs up against the limits of language and ontology” (Critchley 2002, 
19). 
 Simon Critchley is of the opinion that the turn to Levinas was motivated by the question 
of whether the Derridean version of deconstruction had any ethical status (Ibid., 4). Critchley 
supports the correlation of textual alterity and the alterity of the other. This is a point at which 
the question of ethics and the question of language come quite close. While Derrida is regarded 
as playing a pivotal role in the development of Levinas’s thought, Levinas similarly influenced 
Derrida to a great degree, evidenced in Derrida’s claim that “the originary impulse of 
deconstruction lies in the “call” of the “oft-abused other” deconstruction being a positive 
response to an alterity which necessarily calls, summons, or motivates it” (Davis 1996, 63; 
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McGowan 1991, 91). Deconstruction is a vocation – a response to a call (Ibid.). The other, as 
other than self, the other that opposes self-identity precedes philosophy and necessarily invokes 
and provokes the subject, rather than being constituted by it (McGowan 1991, 91-92). In The 
Ethics of Deconstruction (1999) Critchley’s argument is that Derridean deconstruction can, and 
in fact should, be understood as an ethical demand, provided that ethics is understood in the 
Levinasian sense. His contention is that one of the reasons that Derrida’s work has not been read 
as an ethical demand is due either to an avoidance, or an ignorance of the novel conception of 
ethics in Levinas’s thinking (Critchley 1999, 3). 
 Yet Levinas, in theorizing a rejection of Western metaphysics, is aware that it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to formulate a position that can step outside the metaphysical tradition. 
Paradoxically, even as one acknowledges why totality is in such disfavour, it may be impossible 
to abandon it entirely. It has been shown that leave-taking of the tradition never quite succeeds. 
Reactions against or negations of concepts reconfirm their status. The more monolithic, Hegelian 
moment in Derrida confirms the inevitability of the unresolved dialectic between totality and 
anti-totality, as he maintains that we cannot have access to something that is outside, an absolute 
other or absolute negation (McGowan 1991, 90). Derrida argues that counter concepts quickly 
become the foundation of a new system (Ibid.). Leave-taking of the tradition governs Derrida’s 
deconstructive double-reading as the attempt to escape Western metaphysics.  
 At the same time, the more plural, Nietzschean and (dare we say) Levinasian moment in 
Derrida wants to find ways to keep the other from being reconciled to its opposite in the 
dialectical movement towards the same (Ibid.). If Western metaphysics and language are systems 
that imply one another, then the only true outside would be beyond language. Levinas is 
important because he tries to occupy such terrain, pointing toward the experience of an/other that 
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cannot be captured in words in his attempt to find an exit from being. What then is this encounter 
with the absolutely other? Neither representation, nor limitation, nor conceptual relation to the 
same, the ego and the other do not permit themselves to be dominated or made into totalities by a 
concept of relationship (Ibid., 99). The difficulty however remains, as even rejection presupposes 
its own legitimacy in its claims to its own self-presentation as truthful, even if those claims may 
argue against themselves. In other words, the subscription to an “outside” or a “before” 
invariably runs into the difficulty of arguing from “within the four walls of systemic knowledge” 
which one may be critiquing as, “Philosophical discourse can only say the Other in the language 
of the Same, unable to be fully inside or outside its host discourse, determined in its habits of 
thought by that which it rejects” (Davis 1996, 66). The difficulty derives from relying on a 
vocabulary and way of thinking, which is being discredited, thereby restoring what is being 
dislodged (Ibid., 59). Yet in this failure lies the only possibility of success; while the struggle to 
unsay what has been said is an impossibility, the failure must at least describe the ordeal 
accurately. 
 
4.0.12 A Levinasian Ethics of the Other Beyond the Human 
Once defined, the nonhuman other disappears into its new description: it is drawn into a 
symbolic system which orders and explains, interprets and assigns value (Evernden 1992, 
131). 
 
If we are seeking the fundamental basis of an ethical response, that basis cannot be 
worldly; it cannot be within the dialectic of culture and nature, or at the level of 
perception and thought. The basis for responsiveness is in the call for a more radical 
Outside. Nature in this radical sense is, if anything, the refusal of the hegemony of 
perception, language, and thought, it is the “pocket of resistance” and the unpredictable 
par excellence (Toadvine 2003, 149-150). 
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John Llewelyn ascribes to Levinas and Kant similar views in that humans have responsibilities 
for animals, but not directly to them (Llewelyn 1991, 64). Llewelyn feels that “Levinas is so 
preoccupied with doing justice to the human being that he fails to do justice to the non-human 
being” (Ibid., 114). Levinas himself, when pressed to respond about the non-human other, seems 
to be ambivalent. Levinas is not sure if the Other can be non-human. In Totality and Infinity 
(1961), Levinas did not consider an animal to have a face (Atterton 2004, 270). In an interview 
in 1986, however, Levinas appeared to have more difficulty with the question, evident in his 
statement: “One cannot entirely refuse the face of an animal. It is via the face that one 
understands, for example, a dog … The phenomenon of the face is not in its purest form in the 
dog … But it also has a face” (Ibid.).  When asked if the commandment “Thou shall not kill” is 
not also expressed in the face of an animal, Levinas equivocated, “I cannot say at what moment 
you have the right to be called ‘face.’ I don’t know if a snake has a face. I can’t answer that 
question. A more specific analysis is needed” (Ibid., 271).18 
 Yet forging an ecological ethic would insist that this Other can be any other, and 
Levinas’s philosophy, if it is to remain consistent with its spirit of alterity, responsibility and 
asymmetry, can be interpreted to represent the relationship with the non-human other. The break 
with a being-for-itself, a disordering of myself, and an orientation towards the other, is 
established for Levinas by the face-to-face encounter. The Levinasian face “escapes 
representation; it is the very collapse of phenomenality. Not because it is too brutal to appear, but 
because in a sense too weak; non-phenomenon because less than a phenomenon” (Levinas 1981, 
88). The question, which must then be asked, is not whether the other suffers (as done by Jeremy 
                                                         
18 While literature on this issue acknowledges that Levinas vacillates at times it also recognizes 
that, for the most part, like Kant, he does not ascribe the ethical relationship to anything beyond 
the human.  
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Bentham’s utilitarianism), but whether the face of the non-human other can produce a break and 
disturb a being-for-itself? In other words, can the non-human have a face? 
 The face, for Levinas, is not a phenomenal appearance or empirical fact; it is not a relation 
of perception or vision (the search for adequation that absorbs being), as to see the face would 
make of it an intentional object of experience and make it susceptible to the inadequacies of the 
phenomenological act, whereby consciousness conveys meaning on the world around it 
(Critchley 2002, 12; Davis 1996, 46; Diehm 2000, 52; Levinas 1985, 87). The face is not the 
colour of the eyes or skin, and alterity, which cannot be reduced to simple difference, does not 
consist in relative differences in facial features: “The other must be received independently of his 
qualities, if he is to be received as other” (Levinas 1985, 85-86). In other words, what makes the 
other the Other is not specific attributes, but alterity itself. The skin of the face, in its nudity and 
exposure is destitute, containing an essential poverty that we try to mask by putting on poses and 
taking on a continence (Ibid., 86). The face, as exposed, invites us to acts of violence, and yet the 
face is what forbids us to kill, as the meaning of the face says “thou shalt not kill;” the 
prohibition and its ontological reversal is described by Levinas as follows: 
Murder, it is true, is a banal fact: one can kill the Other; the ethical exigency is not an 
ontological necessity. The prohibition against killing does not render murder impossible, 
even if the authority of the prohibition is maintained in the bad conscience about the 
accomplished evil (Ibid., 87). 
 
The face, even though it may be a privileged location for encountering the other, is not limited to 
the face (Ibid., 174). Because it is not the individual of a genus who approaches, saying can, for 
Levinas, break through the limits of language and culture (Horowitz 2000, 305). Levinas's 
writings provide a way in which the unbridgeable gap between human beings and other animals 
can act as the very source of ethical relevance.  
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 The face for Levinas is “a fundamental event,” never quite an object but a “happening” 
which is ethical in the sense that the event of being faced by the other puts into question the I 
concerned with itself (cited in Diehm 2000, 52). The face is the one who is destitute, who has 
been laid low, the one “to whom I am obliged” and for whom I can find the resources to respond 
to the call (Levinas 1985, 89). Precisely because the other is in need and weak (the widow, the 
stranger, the orphan), the other commands from a position of height (height is asymmetry). It is 
the asymmetrical condition of the ethical relationship which is here impressed, as the face does 
not claim an economical reciprocation, but rather claims the I absolutely, breaking with the 
economical altogether, a situation which is both applicable and absolving of the non-human 
(Diehm 2000, 52). What summons me to responsibility is the expression of the other’s 
nakedness; the vulnerability of the other’s face, nape, body, or the hand one shakes “faces us” as 
an ethical command (Ibid., 56). If the claim of the incarnate other is the claim of the one who is 
weak, vulnerable, exposed to violation, then it is difficult to hold any radical distinction between 
the alterity of the human and that of the other-than-human. As Levinas has said, “[t]he human 
face is the face of the world itself” (Levinas 1996c, 73). Humans, the earth, animals, plants: all 
life is the face, as there is a frailty, vulnerability there which commands us all with the sheer 
otherness of the non-human world. It is the radical alterity and absence of reciprocity of the non-
human that make an even stronger case for Levinasian ethics in regard to the non-human world.   
 Even though Levinas shows some ambivalence with respect to whether the face of the 
non-human can command me, forging an ecological ethic maintains that the Other can be “any 
other,” the other can be found on faces other-than-human, even on the face of the earth (Diehm 
2003, 171). For ultimately, it is only a voice from beyond which can call us to responsibility for 
this planet of ours. If the only voice we hear can always be assimilated to our own project and 
66 
projections, then the very idea of responsibility makes no sense. For responsibility is response-
ability, a responsiveness to another’s need, implying our being addressed in the accusative by 
someone, or something, both before and other than ourselves. 
  
4.0.13 From Ethics to Politics and Back in Levinas 
Justice remains justice only in a society where there is no distinction between those close 
and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the 
closest (Levinas 1981, 159). 
 
Levinas tells us that his ethics must lead to some theory of justice, but he does not detail what 
this theory might be (Critchley 2002, 27). It is possible to be genuinely uncertain about which 
course of action to follow in specific situations, but the strength of Levinas’s position lies in 
reminding us of the nature of the ethical demand which must be presupposed at the basis of all 
moral theories, and hence enactments of justice (Ibid., 2). Given the innumerable conflicting 
demands of the political condition, how can we reconcile the seemingly private ethical 
relationship Levinas sets up in his “moral party of two,” in his “Garden of Eden,” with all the 
diverse and oft times conflicting calls and claims for justice in the political (Bauman 1999, 151; 
Davis 1996, 9)? As Levinas says: “If proximity ordered me only to the other alone, there would 
not have been any problem, even in the most general sense of the term” (Levinas 1981, 157). 
Clearly, Levinas’s “party of two” is the domain of the ethical, a condition in which there is only 
one given other, other than myself, in which morality and justice exist simultaneously: a 
condition capable of sustaining the universe on its own, with no need of codes or rules, reason or 
knowledge, argument or conviction, a primal scene of morality ‘before’ everything (Bauman 
1999, 151; Llewelyn 1991, 37). This is the original face-to-face; not a power relation, outside 
any struggle of wills, beyond any calculations (Llewelyn 1991 p. 37, 41). In the “moral party of 
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two” actions cannot be classified as egoistic or altruistic, as the I and the Other are irreplaceable, 
it makes no sense to think of actions in terms of “interests” (Ibid.). It is inside this party that my 
responsibility is unlimited and cannot be fulfilled and it is under this condition that the command 
needs no argument or threat to gain authority (Ibid). 
 A grouping of two cannot provide “rules of conduct” for society and a grouping of three 
cannot be ethical and while Levinas blurs the distinction, it is not abandoned entirely (Ibid., 50, 
54). Thus, the relation with the Other is never uniquely the relation with the Other, as the third is 
always already represented in the Other. There is no pure immediacy, no saying without a said, 
no ethics without ontology, as the ethical relation is always already troubled and problematized 
by the demand for justice (Critchley 1999, 230). The bridge from the Other to the others is not 
chronological; rather the others “concern me from the first” (Levinas 1981, 159). The 
transformation from the “party of two” to the just society begins with the Other, who is the third; 
the third is never absent from the eyes of the Other (Bauman 2004, 112; Llewelyn 1991, 128). 
The relationship with the third party is an incessant correction of the asymmetry of proximity: “If 
I am alone with the Other, I owe him everything … [but] there is a necessity to moderate this 
privilege of the Other” (Levinas 1981, 158; Levinas 1985, 90). The third party/justice 
paradoxically puts a limit on responsibility, allowing for the question of distributive justice to 
emerge, — namely, a comparison of claims (Critchley 1999, 231). The third party reveals the 
potential existence of innumerable subjects, any of whom, including me, can play the role of 
Other to all others (Davis 1996, 83). The discovery of the third party disturbs the intimacy of my 
relationship with the Other, provoking a questioning that opens up broader perspectives for 
society (Ibid., 83). The third introduces a contradiction into the saying that, prior to the entrance 
of the third party, only went “in one direction” (Levinas 1981, 157). The third is the “birth of the 
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question: What do I have to do with justice?” (Ibid.) For Levinas, “justice is necessary, that is 
comparison, coexistence, contemporaneousness, assembling, order, thematization, the visibility 
of faces, and thus, intentionality and the intellect, and in intentionality and the intellect, the 
intelligibility of a system” (Ibid.). The ethical relationship is not a private affair, “self-sufficient” 
or “forgetful of the universe” but places itself within a political context, in the full light of the 
public order (Critchley 1999, 223; Critchley 2002, 24-25). Justice is not founded on universal 
principles; justice, society and institutions are comprehensible out of proximity (Levinas 1981, 
159). In the words of Levinas, “This means that nothing is outside of the control of the 
responsibility of the one for the other” and it means that I can also claim justice for myself 
because I am “an other like the others” (Ibid., 159, 161). Levinas states that, “the relationship 
between the neighbour and the third party cannot be indifferent to me when I approach” as there 
is “also justice for me” (Ibid.16, 159). The asymmetry of my responsibility for the Other does 
not mean that I cannot expect to be treated with fairness and respect. As Simon Critchley 
explains, the community has a double structure, since it is a commonality among equals, which is 
at the same time based on the inegalitarian moment of the ethical relation (Critchley 1999, 227). 
The simultaneous revelation of the other and the third party allows Levinas to combine 
asymmetry and equality within the social relation (Davis 1996, 53). The step beyond the 
responsibilities of the individual subject is made possible by the third. In the other, we connect to 
the third person, which is the universal. For Levinas, the third “is the birth of thought, 
consciousness, justice and philosophy” (Levinas 1981, 128, 160). With the advent of justice 
justified violence comes on the scene and this is precisely why the ethical relation is necessarily 
impossible.   
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 Levinas’s thinking does not result in apoliticism or ethical quietism; rather ethics leads 
back to politics, to the demand for a just polity (Critchley 2002, 24). What would it mean then, to 
have politics mediated ethically, to have ethics lead back to politics, to the demand for justice? 
Politics provides the continual horizon of Levinasian ethics, while “ethics is ethical for the sake 
of politics – that is, for the sake of a new conception of the organization of political space,” for 
the sake of a more just society (Critchley 1999, 223; Critchley 2002, 24-25). Levinas allows us 
to look at justice and politics in terms not alien to reason (Horowitz 2000, 300). He does not 
confront or reject reason, or systemic and logical thinking, as they have their place; they are 
required for the establishment of power structures that satisfy necessary needs and protect us 
against the excesses of violence (Lash 1996, 93; Wild 1969, 14, 18). While reason is necessary, 
it is also not enough. What he wants to criticize is the belief that only political rationality can 
answer political problems (Critchley 2002, 24; Levinas 1969, 300). For Levinas, the state, 
institutions and the courts that they support reveal themselves to an inhuman determinism – 
politics makes it essential to return to its motivation in the “justice and a foundational inter-
humanity” of the intersubjective relationship, proximity, the face-to-face encounter (Levinas 
1997b, 104-105). For Levinas, justice, exercised through the inevitability of institutions, must 
always be held in check by the initial interpersonal relationship, everything begins as if there 
were only two (Levinas, 1985, 90). Prior to these systems that are necessary to meet needs, and 
presupposed by them, is the individual (Wild 1969, 14). Responsibility unfolds outside the state 
and the rational order, resting upon the irreducible ethical responsibility of the face-to-face 
encounter. The state cannot be genuinely pluralistic since, in the interest of justice for all, “there 
are cruelties which are terrible because they stem from that very necessity for rational order ... 
there are tears that the functionary cannot see” (Gardiner 1996, 133). The institutions of totality, 
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including law, politics and history, can only judge the individual as a universal I, excluding the I 
as a singularity from the totality (Lash 1996, 93). In the words of Levinas,  
the We, aspires to a State, institutions, laws, which are the source of universality. But 
politics left to itself bears a tyranny within itself; it deforms the I and the other who have 
given rise to it, for it judges them according to universal rules, and thus as in absentia 
(Levinas 1969, 300). 
  
For Levinas, the relation of ethics to politics, and the move back to politics after the 
ethical moment has been delineated, can be stated as a move back to the said, a return and 
reopening of the question of justice, politics, community and ontology, as well as the question of 
questioning itself (Levinas 1981, 128; Critchley 1999, 228, 220-221) Levinas understands the 
necessity of the “betrayal,” of the saying in the said (Critchley 1999, 230). The return to the said 
is not a return to the pure said of ontology, but to a said that maintains the trace of ethical saying 
within itself (Ibid., 232). Even though ethics is distinct from justice, it is also the fundamental 
requirement of justice, since justice must allow its justice to be ruptured and disrupted by ethics 
(Ajzenstat 2001, 52). In the order of the ethical relation, the I and the other occupy a diachronic 
order. In the order of justice, the I and the Other occupy the same synchronic order: we are co-
citizens, and while ethically I cannot demand that the other be good – I am simply responsible to 
him or her – at the level of politics I am entitled to judge (Critchley 1999, 232). For Levinas, 
judgment is political judgment (Ibid.).  
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Section V THE DISCOURSE OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL MOVEMENT IS BASED 
ON THE ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP 
 
5.0 A Justified Post-Levinasian Environmental Movement 
 The question is how to translate the relation with the Other to all the Others, already 
present from the very beginning. How to respond responsibly and concretely? Levinas’s ethics 
are more than concern, they occur across materiality in giving the bread from one’s mouth, as “It 
is not a gift of the heart” as “only a subject that eats can be for the other” (Levinas 1981, 74). 
Likewise, he does not provide a formula based on reason because his entire enterprise is not to 
provide principles, but to access, via phenomenology, a moment (that passes all too quickly) and 
remind us of its ‘happening.’ His task is to cause us to remember that the realm of justice cannot 
justify itself, it has in its self-sufficiency forgotten (forgotten that it has forgotten) what makes its 
own possibility possible. That task is incumbent on the ethical event, and the environmental 
movement can be viewed as the attempt to practically delineate the ethical in the realm of the 
political. The environmental movement is in the order of the reason of the said, a political 
response in the realm of ontology. It is also otherwise, infused with the saying that cannot be 
disentangled from it, that overflows it, coming back as a trace. Ethics requires the third, and 
environmentalism can be seen as the organized systemic/political/state/institutional manifestation 
of the totality, wherein is located the trace as a response to the non-human other. The political, as 
the calling into question of critique, is a requirement of the ethical. The intent of turning to the 
environmental movement is to show how in the realm of the third, the role of the movement is to 
bring the ethical relationship into thematization. To not thematize would isolate the duality and 
leave it vulnerable to the excessive tyranny of the asymmetrical that excludes responsibility to all 
the others. Environmentalism is the political negotiation of our environmental responses to the 
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ethical relationship with the non-human world, a response that does not forget nor simply 
philosophize its betrayal of the ethical. This is the context in which the environmental movement 
is herein articulated in a post-Levinasian world. And as such, it must be articulated as more than 
knowledge, principle, and theme, it also requires just action. It is in the Appendix that the paper 
will address such action.  
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Section VI 
6.0 Conclusion 
 The discussions in this paper have been entered into with the hope of bringing to 
environmental conversations some insights in the field of theory. The discourses that were 
presented with respect to our relationship with nature are not separate from discussions reflected 
in the philosophical tradition, and the paper has tried to give a rendering of some of the debates 
and paths taken in the conversations, with the understanding that, as discourses, they always took 
place after the ethical moment had passed. This was not to diminish discourse but to place it into 
a context that in a sense worked backward. I have also attempted in this paper to contextualize 
environmentalism itself as well as the wider field of theory. In this respect, the paper has 
discussed a certain crisis of our times in a post-metaphysical age that entails the abandonment of 
the hoped-for progress of history, under the guidance of Enlightenment rationality, including the 
more recent eschewing of all appeals to ontological, epistemological or ethical absolutes that 
have emerged with the turn in theory to a poststructural/postmodern hegemony. But the end of 
essences and metaphysics does not mean the end of ethics, and it is in fact with the end of 
metaphysics that ethics finally comes into its own (Cohen 1985, 4). As Richard Cohen states in 
the Introduction to Ethics and Infinity (1985): 
What ethics is does not survive the end of metaphysics – but only because ethics never was 
or is anything. Ethics does not have an essence, its “essence,” so to speak, is precisely not 
to have an essence, to unsettle essences. Its “identity” is precisely not to have an identity, 
to undo identities. Its “being” is not to be but to be better than being. Ethics is precisely 
ethics by disturbing the complacency of being (or of non-being, being’s correlate) 
(Ibid.,10). 
 
 
It is in a responsibility for the non-human as the remotest other, inaccessible to our cognitive 
powers while still phenomenologically accessible (as an ethical command/summons), that the 
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Levinasian ethical encounter has been posited as “an ethics of ethics” that can address the 
seeming ethical void with which the refusal of totality has been associated. And while a 
Levinasian environmental ethic precedes a politics of the environment, the environmental 
movement as a manifestation of the Levinasian trace of the saying can be discussed as a 
responsibility for the radical alterity of nature as the non-human other. 
 There are differing philosophical understandings of environmentalism, however, and one 
of the tasks of a post-Levinasian philosophy of environmentalism is to engage the distinctions 
and differentiations. It is not in those forms of philosophical environmentalism that differ 
radically, but in those that come quite close to Levinas, that the exercise becomes more poignant, 
as it is here that the finer points of what makes Levinas particularly applicable to an 
environmental ethic becomes more pronounced. It is by looking at Neil Evernden’s The Social 
Creation of Nature (1992) as such an example (where the closeness is both remarkable yet omits 
the crucial element of what a post-Levinasian environmental ethic could mean) that we will turn 
our attention. 
 Evernden, in the section, The Liberation of Nature, speaks of having an actual experience, 
not a cultural explanation of otherness (Everenden 1992, 110). He quotes Merleau-Ponty’s 
statement of the phenomenological method as a direct experience of the world: “To return to 
thing themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge” (cited in Evernden 1992, 
110). Evernden also points to the experience of childhood as a time when nature is not 
encountered formally or abstractly, “before the small human becomes forever a creature of 
culture and must dwell in the domain of abstractions and representations” (Ibid., 114). It is in 
childhood where all “the beauty of things” from nature cannot be assimilated (Ibid., 117).   
 Evernden speaks about a kinship between the experience of nature in childhood and the 
75 
experience of the “wholly other” in the religious preoccupation of Rudolph Otto that Evernden 
believes can be secularized. Here the significance of otherness, removed from explanation, is 
described as “awe,” seemingly the only appropriate response beyond conception, but not beyond 
experience (Ibid., 116) Explanation of any phenomenon makes it “one of” something else, 
another instance of the same (Ibid., 117). Acceptance of it “in its full individuality as a unique 
and astonishing event” makes the encounter fundamentally religious in an attitudinal, 
nonecclesiastical sense, as radial otherness is at the base of all awe and astonishment, something 
quite different from anything that can be rendered in rational concepts, something absolutely 
wondrous that transcends thought (emphasis in original) (Ibid.).  
  Similarly, Evernden refers to R.W. Hepburn’s suggestion that the wonder that nature 
invokes does not imply possession but permits the other to remain unmastered and other (Ibid., 
118). It is in wonder that we accept the presence of something entirely distinct and self-
possessed, never ours in any sense but “ultrahuman,” where “ultra” in this usage refers to that 
which is “beyond” humanity. It was Richard Jeffries the naturalist (who is credited with the term 
ultrahuman) who came to the term out of what he referred to as “the old error,” premised upon 
the fact that the creatures he loved and appreciated did not return this care to him in a reciprocal 
manner (Ibid.). Jeffries comments that “All nature, the universe far as we see, is anti- or ultra-
human, outside, and has no concern with man” as we can never know it or own it, as it is beyond 
(cited in Evernden 1992, 118). Viewed by Evernden as liberating, this stance releases nature 
from being a personal interpretation to being its own (Ibid.). 
          But while the phenomenological experience of “the things themselves” before cognition, 
and otherness beyond essence is herein depicted, what is missing is the ethical turn, precisely 
what Levinas gave to phenomenology. This is what Levinas’s ethical turn – not situated in 
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empathy and reciprocity, but as a response to the otherness of the other – can give to 
environmentalism as an encounter, where “The I always has one responsibility more than all the 
others” (Levinas 1985, 99). Returning to “the things themselves” may transcend the 
subject/object distinction, while awe, wonder, and miracles may be the beyond of nature as an 
acknowledgment of radical otherness, but Levinas says more than this. He says that the I cannot 
remain indifferent (even though nature can) as “There is no eluding or declining the appeal, I 
cannot slip away from the call” (Levinas 1981, 53, 85). The phenomenological description offers 
ecological investigation an alternative point of departure, however, it is the ethical turn as the 
responsibility for another that is the unique Levinasian contribution. Environmental theories, in 
ascribing indifference to nature, inadvertently reflect nature’s indifference into our relationship 
with nature in such a way that the projection contains an embedded symmetrical indifference. It 
is in the disengagement from instrumentality and the recognition of radical alterity that much 
environmentalism absolves us of any responsibility by omission; what is explicitly required is an 
expression of asymmetrical responsibility. This exclusion is addressed by Levinas. This is how 
the otherness of the other elicits responsibility as the very founding moment of subjectivity and 
what Levinas can bring to environmental theory. Here radical alterity, rather than indifference, 
imposes an obligation where the I is responsible to the point of substitution. Here is the meaning 
of Levinas’s phrase, “an ethics of ethics” that represents the additional obligatory element that 
Levinas can bring to environmental thought, responsibility for the otherness of the other “is the 
impossibility of being silent” (Ibid., 143).           
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Section VII ADDENDUM  
7.0 The Call of the World, Windshare, the Response 
The first step in establishing a new social order appears to be the construction of a new 
nature that will justify, even demand, its implementation (Evernden 1992, 16). 
 
While Levinasian ethics does not prescribe a practical plan or direction, the question that must be 
asked is, what would it mean to have the call of the non-human other responded to ethically, to 
have environmental ethics lead back to the demand for environmental justice? A Levinasian 
understanding would require that ethical responsibility for the irreducible otherness of the non-
human is always present as a trace in the concrete practice of responding. Responsibility by its 
very nature cannot avoid a response. Because Levinas’s ethical transcendence occurs across the 
sheer physicality of material experience, where action must be taken, and while searching for 
new technological capabilities with respect to environmental responsibility alone is not a 
solution, at the same time, dismissing alternative technological innovation eliminates valuable 
contributions to a situation that warrants immediate attention. A responsible response cannot 
avoid a search for policy proposals. The presentation of this addendum proposes that priority be 
given to renewable energy production, to do everything possible to encourage its development 
and use. It is also designed to look at Toronto’s Windshare project as a tangible response that is 
the manifestation of such a policy alternative.  
While historically the Ontario electricity market has been operated as a public service 
monopoly, the issue of privatization was put on the public agenda and with the passage of Bill 
35, Ontario’s Energy Competition Act, the stage was set for a radical transformation of the 
generation and retail sectors of the electricity marketplace. As a result of the deregulation 
process, and the most recent government initiation of Standard Offer Contracts for projects of 10 
MW or less, it has become possible not only for the consumption, but, for local generation and 
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production of electricity to take place. And so we turn to the Toronto Renewable Energy Co-
operative (TREC), created by the North Toronto Green Community, a neighbourhood-based 
environmental group that addresses the environmental and social issues around energy 
production. TREC saw the possibility created by the deregulation of electricity in Ontario to shift 
control and responsibility for power directly to individuals and communities. In so doing it 
managed to return to direct democratic control the means of production and consumption 
challenging the separation of production and consumption in the logic of capitalism. This 
situation has created an opportunity to determine electrical power generation in Ontario in a way 
that harmonizes with natural cycles, does not create emissions or hazardous waste, and gives 
individuals the additional possibility of taking part in their own governance; becoming both 
producers and consumers of electricity – not a small feat in a society where our sense of helpless 
alienation (the more postmodern term would be fragmentation) is profound.  
 Wind energy needs support, but it also needs specifically designed planning policies with 
respect to land use. At the present time, the Province has committed to implementing a Standard 
Offer Contract, also known as an Advanced Renewable Tariffs program, recognizing the 
uniqueness of smaller renewable energy projects.19 The Ontario Ministry of Energy and its 
implementation agency, the Ontario Power Authority, are going to make an announcement 
concerning the details of a program that, if designed properly, could make it possible for 1000s 
of MW of renewable energy to be developed across Ontario. Standard Offer Contracts will 
enable farmers, co-operatives, municipalities, First Nations and small businesses to build and 
                                                         
19Standard Offer Contracts are very new and crucial to the development of small community 
power projects such as Windshare as they guarantee a standard purchase price for power for a 
period of 20 years at $0.11/k Wh with small yearly increases to partially account for inflation. By 
guaranteeing a power purchase above the level of the Ontario price cap, they help wind power 
become more competitive with other forms of power generation such as nuclear, natural gas and 
renewables such as hydro (which have been continually subsidized).  
79 
generate wind, solar, biogas and small hydro projects. The Advanced Renewable Tariffs could 
aid in revolutionizing the way that Ontarians relate to electricity and help the province meet 
electricity generation demand from renewable sources. By enabling community power projects, 
we may realize a cultural sensibility that begins to conceive of power production in terms that 
work with natural process. Positive benefits would include local investment in rural 
economically depressed agricultural communities, allowing farmers to keep farming. Unions 
have shown an interest in becoming part of the development of the wind industry in Ontario, 
perhaps a means to shift workers from the automotive sector to turbine production. Other 
countries with Standard Offer Contracts have managed to significantly increase their renewable 
energy capacity, in addition to showing a dramatic increase in industrial and job developments 
associated with the renewable energy sector.  
 The placement of the wind turbine on Toronto’s lakeshore represents the first wind 
turbine in an urban centre in North America. This is a new development with respect to the 
energy sector in this province. The turbine has begun the process of making into a ‘movement’ in 
Ontario what has previously been an array of marginalized energy/power approaches. These 
have consisted of rural solutions to energy needs on the farm, an answer to those who go where 
the cost of the grid is prohibitive, or those employing a radical individualism using isolated 
‘power guerrilla’ tactics in forging an alternative method for the production of electricity. The 
co-operative model wind turbine project is about changing not only how we produce power but 
also how we structure the ‘ownership’ and ‘management’ of that power once it is produced. 
Windshare presents us with a means of changing our collective activity. This is not to dismiss 
that the work of finding any real long-term solution to the environmental crisis means that we 
must make some radical changes to the ways in which we live, but, at the same time, it is to be 
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able to address and respond to the radical alterity of nature in the political realm, an institutional 
response that has retained an ethical trace. 
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